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Mysteries of Stalin's death

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FROM THE AUTHOR

At the top of the pyramid of the Soviet partocracy, there was not enough room for two criminal geniuses - for Stalin and Beria. Sooner or later, one had to give way to the other, or both would perish in the mutual struggle. Both happened almost simultaneously. This work is dedicated to the reconstruction of the historical process of the last five years of Stalin's rule (1948-1953), which led to this.

Under tyrannical regimes, politics is the art of alternating intrigues. The courtiers intrigue to get closer to the tyrant, and the tyrant to set them against each other.

friend: after all, the courtiers, constantly competing with each other, are not capable of

organize a  
conspiracy against his master. In such intrigues, Stalin and his clique did not have  
equal.

Stalin surrounded himself with people whose loyalty was determined not by social ideals, but only by career considerations. Each of them fought for Stalin, for Stalin -

this is power, but so that they would not unite against him in the struggle for power, Stalin kindled mutual hatred among them. This tactic also  
had another advantage: when Stalin needed to "spill" one of his clique, he did it on the denunciations of some, with the enthusiasm of others,  
and with the tacit consent of the rest.

The most elementary sense of collegial solidarity for the salvation of its individual representatives has been atrophied among the ruling elite, if only for the sake of their own salvation. Stalin took advantage of this before the war, on the way to sole tyranny. This

Stalin continued to use it after the war, until the most capable of his students, Beria, surpassed his teacher.

If each of the members of Stalin's last Politburo died or will die a natural death, it is because of the one they killed: Beria. If the second, much  
more formidable than in Yezhovshchina, "great purge" did not take place, if hundreds of thousands of people were saved from KGB bullets, and millions  
from concentration camps, then most likely the country is also obliged to Beria.

Is not  
was his goal, but it was his unwitting merit.

When Stalin decided to liquidate his "old guard" (Molotovites), appealing to the "young guard" (Malenkovites). Beria was the first to unravel his strategic plan - to destroy all members of the Politburo according to the pattern of the 20s and 30s: the "old guard" - with the help of the "young guard", the "young guard" - with the help of "nominees". But Stalin miscalculated: now he was surrounded not by the

ideological dupes of the 20s, not by the political eunuchs of the 30s

years, about his spiritual twins, nurtured by himself, according to his own criminal way of thinking and acting. But at the height of criminal art  
most

Stalin stood among them only one Beria. Fortunately for the peoples of the USSR, God deprived Stalin of reason at the very moment  
when he directed his anger towards Beria.

With an incomprehensible oversight, Stalin gave himself away by formulating the accusation of the Kremlin "doctors-conspirators":  
after all, the accusation of the entire network of supreme state security organs of connivance with the "conspirators" was directly directed against Beria. Beria knew both Stalin and the fate of his predecessors too well to build illusions. Stalin

Now we needed his head. Beria had no other means of saving her than to deprive Stalin himself of his own head.

This is how Beria's conspiracy against Stalin, unparalleled in difficulty, but also brilliant in execution technique, was organized. The organizer of the conspiracy proved that he surpassed Stalin in what the latter considered

was a luminary: in the art of organizing political assassinations!

Naturally, as a result, Stalin's power ended up with Beria. The members of the Politburo, whose fate Beria could now control, decided to take power from him. Headed by Khrushchev, a second conspiracy, unparalleled in cowardice, was created - against Beria, a conspiracy that, in essence, was a murder from around the corner. However, the conspiracy organized subsequently against Khrushchev himself was the same - with the only difference that he was left in

alive.

Not abstract speculations, not artificial constructions, but the logic of a whole chain indirect

evidence, called evidence in jurisprudence, led me to the final conclusion: Stalin died as a result of a conspiracy. This conspiracy was not an improvisation.

It was only the last act of that long post-war tragedy in which the actors seemed to change roles: the heroes destined for death killed the "immortal" in order to

by ourselves

stay alive. I cannot say the same about the second aspect with the same certainty.

my topic: how Stalin was killed. Collapse as a consequence of the shock from the meeting of the Politburo followed by sabotage treatment or slow-acting poison obtained from Beria? However, the evidence I have collected for this or that case, I present to the court

the reader himself.

I will not dwell on the characteristics of the Soviet and Western sources I used, but a little must be said about my private sources of information

from the USSR. In this respect, he was in a slightly more advantageous position than other historians.

on

West. This is explained by the fact that the KGB widely advertised my book The Technology of Power (1959): at many political trials in Moscow, Leningrad, Kiev and other cities it appeared - in the publication of samizdat - as material evidence against the defendants (for it, the masters of falsification from the Central Committee wrote me a biography in which

no no

one word of truth except my name). Already in that book he wrote

that the mysterious death of Stalin followed, probably, as a result of a conspiracy of the four (Beria, Malenkov, Khrushchev, Bulganin) and that the very underlining in the official report about the location of the ill Stalin "in Moscow in his apartment" is suspicious (A. Avtorkhanov. Technology of power. 1959, pp. 282, 285). All mine

further searches over  
the past years were devoted to this "mystery of Stalin's death." But since "Technology

authorities" republished not only samizdat, but also the Central Committee of the CPSU - in the publishing house

"Thought", with the stamp "forbidden literature", then it turned out to have a relatively wide circle of readers. Hence the influx to me through various channels of additional information about how some of the post-war events I

describe took place. Unfortunately, at the time of writing the book, I was unable to use them fully. The time had not yet come for that. An exception was made only in cases where the authenticity of the material appears to be undeniable or can be objectively verified.

#### A. AVTORKHANOV

When one of the Bolshevik conquerors of Georgia, Budu Mdivani, an ally of Lenin and an enemy of Stalin, was led to

execution in 1937, he grunted at the entire corridor of the Metekhi castle: "Let Stalin not forget that Danton was followed

by Robespierre's turn!" Stalin did everything in the future so that the Georgian Danton would not turn out to be a prophet. Before the war, he coped brilliantly with this task, not without taking into account the lesson of Robespierre.

Robespierre sent only separate groups from the Convention to the scaffold, generously protecting the Convention

itself, but then the Convention sent him there too. Stalin, as a dictator, acted more sensibly: having dealt with his ultra-

revolutionary Hebertists (Trotskyists) and right-wing opportunist Dantonists (Bukharinists) with the help of the Bolshevik

Convention, Stalin finally sent to the scaffold this Convention, blindly devoted to him, the Central Committee of

1934. Stalin, when it came to his personal security, did not look for enemies - he destroyed potential enemies (groups, classes and even entire peoples), believing that it would be difficult, and perhaps even impossible, to destroy

them when they become real enemies. ..

#### DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE POLITBURO AND STALIN

To put it figuratively, in the post-war years, Stalin ruled the country like a helmsman in stormy weather on the ocean,

thoughtlessly throwing a leaky boat against formidable waves. Its passengers - members of the Central Committee

- either continuously pumped water from the bottom of the boat, or desperately rushed from

one side to the other to balance her movement, but the inexorable helmsman balanced it by throwing them overboard one by one. How many of them have been thrown out over the past three years in the

"Leningrad

case", in the "Zionist case", in the "Georgian case", in

the beginning of the "Moscow case", in which, according to Stalin's plan, could be

included

the rest of the surviving passengers of the Stalinist boat?! It doesn't matter that the passengers themselves told the helmsman who to throw out first, something else is important: they all knew that with this helmsman, sooner or later, the same fate would befall each of them.

Stalin came to the conclusion that under the current conditions, it is best to destroy everyone, both the "Old Guards" and the "Young Guards", according to the recipes of the 20s.

Beria and Malenkov perfectly learned to read Stalin's hidden thoughts and unraveled all of it

strategic plan. And then something happened that Stalin considered absolutely out of the question:

On the initiative of Beria and Malenkov, the members of the Politburo came to a saving compromise for them and entered into a defensive alliance against Stalin's plans. result this

Union and there was a decision of the Politburo to convene in August 1952 a plenum of the Central Committee of the CPSU (b) and appoint him to convene a party congress.

According to the party's formally operating charter, its congresses were to be convened at least once every three years. The last congress was before the war - in March 1939. Stalin, willingly agreeing

on the accurate conduct of elections to the then Soviet pseudo-parliament, in no way agreed

for the election of a new Central Committee at the next party congress. Thus, more than four terms for convening the congress were missed. During this time, the Great Patriotic War began and ended, the most important international and domestic decisions were made, which are within the competence of the party congress alone, and Stalin did not even think of convening it. Moreover, even the plenum of that pre-war Central Committee, whose members during the war played such a decisive role in the political organization of the front and

rear

country, has not been convened for more than five years (according to the charter, it must be convened once every three months).

It is difficult to find another reason for not convening the congress, except for Stalin's fear that the "disciples" within the framework of the charter would legally deprive him of his sole power. His fears were not unfounded.

After the "Leningrad affair" Stalin began to lose control over the apparatus of the party and the police to the same extent that the influence of Malenkov and Beria was growing there.

Stalin did not want any party congress until the planned second "great purge"

- there is no doubt about this (the 18th Congress was also created only after the first "great purge", in 1939).

True, the announcement of the convocation of the congress and its agenda was published signed by one general secretary.

retary of the Central Committee of Stalin. But that's how it's always been done. Most striking was the unprecedented

fact: for

the first time during Stalin's rule, the political report of the Central Committee was made not by Stalin, but by Malenkov.

This immediately caused bewilderment: what happened? Either Stalin is unwell, or he deliberately nominated the "crown prince" he had chosen as the chief political reporter of the Central Committee. Only later

we learned that both assumptions were false. Stalin was in good health, wrote more "discussion" articles, was present at the congress and even made a short speech at the end of the congress (not on the substance of the work of the congress, but with an appeal to foreign communist parties that,

like us

we will see later, also had its significance). And Stalin did not designate anyone for the "crown princes", knowing full well the danger of such an enterprise.

Two other assumptions remain: either Stalin refused to make a report at a congress organized and convened against his will, or the Politburo, which now did not share many

of Stalin's practical proposals and measures, it decided to entrust the report to Malenkov, the opening of the congress to Molotov, and the closing to Voroshilov.

Khrushchev, who was forced by party interests to adhere to a certain scheme, always enveloped some part of the truth in a fog of lies. He wanted to assure us that the orders to Molotov and Voroshilov also came from Stalin. But in doing so, he disproved himself.

Indeed, from the official speeches of the same Khrushchev at the 20th Congress, we know that What

after the Twentieth Congress, during the first organizational plenum of the new Central Committee, Stalin accused Molotov of spying for America

and Voroshilov of spying for England, and their Jewish wives were already sitting in the cellars of the Lubyanka on the same charges. But from the reports of the 20th Congress we know that it was solemnly opened by Molotov and solemnly closed by Voroshilov. According to party tradition, these honorary duties were previously performed by Lenin, and since Stalin

refused to adopt them, a new order was introduced: the congresses were opened and closed by two different persons from the most popular old members of the Politburo.

The question is, how could Stalin give such honor to those whom he was going to expose as spies at the end of the same congress? It is clear that they were put forward not by Stalin, but by the Politburo as a result of the aforementioned "historical compromise", as it is also clear that they were saved from Stalin's reprisals by the apparatus headed by Malenkov - Beria.

Anyone who thinks that Stalin was in control of everything, that he had only to "move his little finger" - and all his

enemies will fly into the air, he forgets that Stalin's power was based on the absolute obedience of the direct managers of the machine of power. They are now came out

out of obedience. What could Stalin do alone, without them? Go to Red Square and call on the people to revolt?

Before analyzing the work of the 20th Congress and analyzing the results of its plenum of the Central Committee, it is necessary to cast a cursory glance at the recent past.

It is naive to think that the political development in the leadership of the party and the state was determined only by the mutual intrigues of the Stalinists, or to declare Stalin's seemingly senseless brutal terror the result of paranoia. Both the intriguers and Stalin fought not only for power, but also for a certain course of the Kremlin's domestic and foreign policy. Stalin did not kill anyone

from

love to kill. Nor was he a sadist, much less paranoid. Such assessments of his actions stem from an incorrect "anthropological" premise: Stalin is viewed as a person with all human attributes, and therefore all his inhuman actions are reduced to mental illness. Meanwhile, all the actions, actions, crimes of Stalin are purposeful, logical and strictly principled. It doesn't have zigzags

mentally ill person: obscuration of the mind, and then enlightenment, delight now, melancholy

an hour later, a crime today and repentance tomorrow, as happened with the really sick Ivan the Terrible. Stalin was a politician who used criminal methods

to achieve a goal. Moreover, he was a unique hybrid of political science and criminal art, surpassing all other politicians in this. Stalin was

fundamentally constant in his atrocities - at the age of eighteen he betrayed his Marxist circle in the Tiflis Theological Seminary to the gendarmes

(justifying himself by the fact that in this way he made the circle members revolutionaries); at twenty-eight, he directed the killing of people on Erivan Square in Tiflis during an armed robbery of the treasury; at thirty-eight, he personally commanded in Tsaritsyn the mass executions of captured "White Guards"; at forty-eight began training

To

extermination of the peasantry; he was fifty-eight years old when, on his orders, in 1937-1938, the Chekists killed millions of innocent people; he was already

seventy years old when he shot a dozen members of the Central Committee, his closest assistants, without trial. Now he has decided

take on  
the rest.

Extravagant actions, as Khrushchev says? Nothing happened. Purposeful and purposeful actions with a brilliant sense of foresight. If Stalin had succeeded in destroying the Politburo of 1952, he probably would have lived longer, and there would have been no anti-Stalinist 20th Party Congress in history at all.

By the 20th Party Congress, Stalin found himself in complete isolation from the rest of the Politburo.

important issues of international and domestic politics. Enough of a cursory analysis

contentious issues to see the depth of disagreement.

So, Stalin simply slept through the radical revolution in world politics and diplomacy as a result of the appearance of thermonuclear weapons. Troubadours of Stalinism wrote more than once that when President Truman at the Potsdam

Conference told Stalin the landmark news that the Americans had invented an unprecedented weapon - the atomic

bomb, Stalin turned the conversation to the topic of the weather. The tragedy of the situation lay in the fact that this bomb did not really make the proper impression on Stalin.

Later, having appointed Beria chairman of the Soviet atomic commission, Stalin, however, did not  
became

pursue a peaceful policy at least until the Soviet bomb is ready. On the contrary, he artificially, sometimes defiantly, provoked major international crises one after another.

to others: forced Bolshevization of Eastern European states in violation of all allied treaties, an attempt to annex Iranian Azerbaijan, presenting demands to Turkey for military bases in the straits, organizing a movement of Soviet

Armenians and Georgians for the return of Armenian and Georgian lands to Turkey, organizing a civil war

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Greece, the demand for the transfer of Libya by Italy to the Soviet Union, the Berlin blockade, the Korean War - all this Stalin did when he did not yet have the mass production of atomic bombs.

One can imagine in what language Stalin was going to speak with the world after he had this production.

The fundamental disagreement between Stalin and the Politburo arose precisely on the question of  
politics

peace. The Politburo was on the same point of view as the West: in the era of thermonuclear weapons, the result of the war

would be only the suicide of mankind. Therefore, the Politburo revised Lenin's main position, which read: in the era of

imperialism, world wars are absolutely inevitable, just as the world communist revolution is inevitable on the ruins of these

wars. The Politburo thought that since in the atomic era wars can only be atomic, and therefore not leading to revolution, then from this teaching of Lenin and

the international policy based on it must be abandoned.

The Politburo cited other arguments: the world socialist system formed after the Second World War and the movement of the broad masses for peace throughout the world are capable of preventing new wars. This most important disagreement

between Stalin and the Politburo is proved by an analysis of party documents. In this regard, we will have to dwell on the polemical work published by Stalin and timed to coincide with the Twentieth Party Congress: "The Economic Problems of Socialism in the USSR" (September 1952).

No other work of Stalin after the war was cited so much by Sovietologists,  
How



"Economic problems of socialism in the USSR", but only one of them remained misunderstood in the West. This is quite natural. Western researchers read only the text, but did not read and

they did not understand the subtext, because they did not know the reasons that brought "Economic problems ..." to life. Here Stalin was not at all concerned with theory, he was not at all busy with the discovery of new abstract laws of Marxism in political economy. He argued with other leading leaders of the Central Committee on the most important issues of further development of the domestic and foreign policy of the USSR. That Stalin was arguing with them, only these leaders of the Central Committee knew, but neither the Soviet people, nor the party, and even more so Western researchers did not know and could not know.

This misunderstanding was aggravated by the fact that it was precisely those whom Stalin opposed who were the first to declare (in words) "Economic Problems ..." Stalin's "brilliant contribution" to Marxism in order to actually sabotage the practical conclusions flowing from them.

We learned about all this only after Stalin's death. A comparison of Stalin's demands in Economic Problems and the practical policy of the Central Committee after his death gives us the key by which we can easily open all the hiding places of controversial issues.

Let us first examine the principles of party documents. This is what the Stalinist Politburo recorded at the 20th Congress;

"Millions of people around the world are asking: is a new war inevitable, is it possible that humanity, which has survived two bloody world wars, will still have to go through

And

third? There is a Marxist-Leninist thesis that as long as imperialism exists, wars are inevitable... New

At present, the situation has changed radically. There is no fatal inevitability of war. Now there are powerful social and political forces that have serious means at their disposal to prevent the imperialists from unleashing a war" ("XX Congress of the CPSU. Verbatim Report", 1956, vol. 1, pp. 37-38).

And here is how Stalin objected: "They say that Lenin's thesis that imperialism inevitably gives rise to wars must be considered

obsolete, since at the present time powerful popular forces have grown up, acting in defense of peace, against a new

world war. This is not true... In order to eliminate the inevitability of wars, it is necessary to destroy imperialism" (I.

Stalin, Economic Problems of Socialism in the USSR, M. 1952, p. 36). The anonymous people with whom Stalin argued at the 20th Congress ("they say") were precisely the members of his Politburo (they are the

So

unanimously and proved at the next, XX Party Congress).

"Peaceful coexistence" is the code definition for Lenin's strategy: to defeat capitalism not by the military force of Soviet Russia, which is generally impossible, but to blow it up

from within  
the infiltration of ideas, people and the organization of permanent revolutionary subversion. That is why it is written in the "Program of the CPSU" (1961)  
that peaceful coexistence "is a specific form of class struggle." We must pay tribute to the heirs of Stalin,

what in  
this dispute, betraying the letter of Leninism, they remained true to its spirit, which could not be said

about Stalin himself.

Although Lenin wrote about the inevitability of wars in the era of imperialism, which seemed to him the last stage of decaying, dying capitalism, he  
nevertheless had a well-developed sense of reality. Therefore, Lenin made a reservation that nullified just

he put forward the thesis, namely: capitalism in the era of imperialism develops faster than before it.

Stalin believes that after the Second World War this statement is invalid. He's writing:

"Can it be argued that Lenin's well-known thesis, expressed by him in the spring of 1916, that, despite the decay of capitalism, "on the whole, capitalism  
is growing immeasurably faster than before," is still valid? I don't think it can be said. In view of the new

conditions that arose in connection with the Second World War, (this. - A. 4.) the thesis is necessary  
count  
invalidated" (ibid., p. 32).

It turned out that the Western economy and technology were not able to develop further, capitalism

now it's over

seriously rotted. Hence the logical conclusion: it's time to celebrate waste on world capitalism. Of course, the realists from the Politburo considered this  
a most dangerous illusion.

In the same work, Stalin argued with the Politburo not only on foreign policy, but also on domestic economic issues. He writes: "... the goal of  
capitalist production is to extract profits ... The goal of socialist production is not profit, but a person with

his  
needs" (ibid., p. 77).

As a result of Stalin's "care" for man, more than 50 percent of Soviet enterprises worked unprofitably. Khrushchev tried to get out of this  
situation with the  
purest voluntarism and failed. The more pragmatic Kosygin and Brezhnev directly wrote in the decision of the September plenum of  
the Central Committee (1965): "... to improve the use of such important

economic  
leverage, like profit, price, premium, credit" ("CPSU in resolutions and decisions of congresses, conferences and  
plenums of the Central Committee", M. 1972, vol. 8, p. 519).

The majority in the Politburo believed that all the equipment of the machine and tractor stations (MTS) should be  
transferred to the collective farms, and Stalin wrote: "... offering the sale of MTS to the property  
collective farms...

they are trying to turn back the wheel of history... (this is A. A.) would not lead to an approach to communism, but, on the contrary, to moving away from it" ("Economic Problems ...", p. 91). The post-Stalin leadership liquidated the MTS and transferred their equipment to the collective farms.

Stalin wrote: "What measures are necessary in order to raise collective-farm property, which is, of course, not public property, to the level of public ("national") property? Some comrades think that it is necessary simply to nationalize collective-farm property, declaring it the property of the whole people... This proposal is completely wrong and absolutely unacceptable" (ibid., p. 87).

Exactly one year after Stalin wrote this, and six months after his death, the September plenum of the Central Committee (1953) took place, laying the foundation

for the nationalization of collective farms,  
A

Brezhnev's leadership forced this nationalization by turning a significant part of the collective farms into state farms, which are considered "public" property. And the surviving collective farms were de facto turned into state property by the decision of the

Tov plenum of the Central Committee and especially the unpublished May decision of the Central Committee (1965).

We have dealt with only a few of those contentious issues between Stalin and the Politburo that can be easily traced through Party documents.

However, there were disagreements  
only  
muffled out.

In domestic politics, this was Stalin's demand for a new "great purge" in the party, army and state apparatus and the continuation, following the example of

Georgia, of mass purges.  
from

"bourgeois nationalists" in all union and autonomous republics. After Georgia, it was the turn of Ukraine. (In early June 1952, at the plenum of the Central Committee of Ukraine, the main issue of discussion was Ukrainian "bourgeois nationalism".)

The main differences between Stalin and the Politburo in international politics concerned the new doctrine, officially formulated for the first time at the forthcoming 20th Congress, about the aforementioned "peaceful coexistence" in the spirit of Lenin. Stalin's disciples and comrades-in-arms believed that the "peaceful coexistence" of socialism and capitalism is, according to Lenin, a "general

line"

Soviet foreign policy. Stalin replied that the slogan of "coexistence" was, in fact, invented by the ideologists of American imperialism to mask the preparations for a third world war against the socialist camp.

Stalin, in fact, in full agreement with Lenin, thought that the "general line" of Soviet foreign policy was a course towards a world proletarian revolution, and as for

"coexistence", Lenin did not even know this word.

A very negative, even harmful role for the USSR was played by another Stalin's attitude:

He

mistakenly believed that after the Second World War, in fact, no liberation of the colonial peoples occurred, only the form of colonialism changed and all these Nehru and Sukarno were hired satraps of the Western empires. Companions and students of Stalin believed that

such an attitude prevents the Soviet Union from entering the rear of the liberated colonies, drawing them into the mainstream of Soviet influence

and opposing them to the former mother countries. Stalin's disciples, acting in the spirit of Stalin of his best times, considered it necessary

and possible to participate financially in the creation of special forms of government and a new type of social community in the former colonies.

Now let's return to the 20th Congress and consider some dry facts, more often protocol ones,

But

sometimes touching on the merits of the case.

We have already noted one such most important fact - the opening of the congress by one "spy" (Molotov) and its closing by another "spy" (Voroshilov).

The second surprise: in violation of the entire Stalinist tradition, three members of the Politburo were not elected to the presidium of the

congress - Mikoyan (two sons, generals, are in prison), Andreev (Jewish wife - in prison) and Kosygin (he was involved in the case of Zhdanovites).

And one more surprise: in listing the rank of the members of the Politburo, Beria, who before the "Mingrelian case" firmly occupied third place,

after Molotov and Malenkov, now found himself in fifth place (even after Bulganin). This is the minutes of the morning meeting.

congress of 5 October. Lest the party take this for a misunderstanding, the chronicle of the congress again

repeats the same "hierarchy of cults".

But Beria took revenge. He delivered the largest speech at the convention. And she was not

only

big, but sharp in style, highly skilled politically and convincing to the ears and minds of party orthodoxies. It was also the only speech that bore the

imprint of the speaker's personality.

Of course, Beria's speech, like other speakers, is a panegyric to Stalin. But his panegyric is targeted: appealing to the greatness of Stalin,

pouring out in loyal feelings, Beria subtly drags through, in essence, an anti-Stalinist heresy - puts the party ahead of Stalin: "The inspirer and

organizer of the great victory of the Soviet people (in the war - 4. A.) was the Communist Party, led by Comrade Stalin" ("Pravda", 9.10.52). Still

in all newspapers, magazines and books one could read that Stalin himself was the "inspirer and organizer", and then, somewhere in the backyard, the party was doing something. Beria made it clear that he had not made a reservation, he ended his speech again with a reference to the party: "The peoples of our country can be sure that the Communist Party, armed with the theory of Marxism-Leninism" - and

then "under the leadership of Comrade Stalin."

Another heresy was defiant. Beria, out of time, and therefore very boldly, reminded the party of the priorities of its national policy:

there are various dangers of deviation from the national policy of the party, and they follow in this order - in the first place is the danger of "velikoder

chauvinism" (meaning Russian chauvinism), in second place is the danger of "bourgeois nationalism" (meaning the danger of local nationalism), and in third place is the danger

"bourgeois cosmopolitanism" (meaning "Zionism" and other "isms").

It can be safely assumed that, except for Stalin and the members of the Politburo, no one at the congress knew that here Beria

was directly arguing with Stalin, who considered bourgeois nationalism, Zionism and

cosmopolitanism was the main danger for the USSR, and Russian great-power chauvinism was not recognized at all.

Another detail is also interesting: Beria devoted more than half of his speech to the national

politics and

the national republics of the USSR, but did not say a word about Georgia and the Georgian "bourgeois nationalists", and yet for his fellow countrymen, the Mingrelians, there were not enough places in the prisons of Tbilisi, Sukhumi and Batumi ...

Beria could not defend them, but he did not condemn them like

Togo

Stalin's current campaign against "bourgeois nationalism" demanded.

## STALIN'S HISTORICAL DEFEAT

One can understand Stalin only by trying to penetrate into his political-psychological world and looking through his eyes at the

situation and prospects for the development of the USSR. Then we will see in the actions of the Soviet dictator not the mania of

persecution, not the quirks and whims of the old man, but the iron logic of the founder of this system, his justified fear for its

integrity, his deepest concern for the carelessness of his students and associates, his gloomy thoughts

O

tomorrow. Stalin's words addressed to his students were quoted at the 20th Congress

And

full of anxiety for the future of the USSR: "You are blind, like newborn kittens; what will happen without me? Stalin was ideal for

dominating a closed society - closed inside, closed outside. The viability and longevity of such a society depended on systematic

regeneration of the cells of power from top to bottom - from the constant purge of exhausted personnel, from the constant renewal of the army of bureaucrats. Stalin's order did not allow for either the free play of forces at the top, or civil initiative in society, even the most loyal one.

The "general line of the party" was strong in its clarity, invulnerability, and imperativeness. IN

her lexicon did not contain the word "think", but the word "act" that was understood and accepted by everyone! "Thinking" is the prerogative of one Stalin, "acting" is the task of the entire party. Therefore, the "order" was ideal, and it was easy to manage. The war introduced disharmony into the "general line". People who went through the war, from the Volga to the Elbe, have become different.

In the depths of his soul, Stalin agreed with the Western wits: "Stalin did only

two mistakes: showed Ivan Europe and Ivan's Europe. Soviet people brought home germs of freedom and social justice: "In Germany, cattle live better than in our country.

people", "the American soldier has more chocolate than our potatoes", "in the West, presidents and ministers are ordinary sinners, while our gods are touchy". It is necessary to return this philosophized, "sick people" to the primitive pre-war state: we need an antibiotic, we need a new, useful bloodletting. The sooner this is done, the sooner he will recover.

The leaders of the Party do not want to understand this at all. They are not even averse to starting a dialogue with the West ("coexistence"!), they are not averse to seeking its help in solving domestic economic (hesitation - to accept or not to accept the "Marshall Plan") and foreign trade problems of the USSR (proposals for economic and technical cooperation), but for this ready to encroach on the holy of holies

monopoly of foreign trade - and slightly open the iron curtain for the circulation of business. But this is the beginning of the end of the "general line". Thousands, millions of new bacilli of the West will move to the USSR through business

channels. The Iron Curtain will become full of holes, and another dialogue will begin: a dialogue between the people

and the government, encouraged and instigated by the West. The unprecedented and irreparable will happen: the people will begin to take an interest in their past and philosophize about the future. New Radishchevs, Belinskys, Herzens will appear. Rus' will spiritually begin to move, and behind it the anti-Russian outskirts, behind them the satellite countries. Here's what

the prospect was drawn to Stalin, if not to return to the old, tested "general lines".

The forecast was correct, but Stalin could have prevented such a development of affairs at the age of forty or fifty, and he was already over seventy; there was no other Stalin in the Politburo, and such people are born once in hundreds of years.

Stalin's old age coincided with the decrepitude of the regime. This regimen could have been extended through non-surgery (it

would have withstood no major surgery), but therapy. In the language of politics, this meant a slow "descent on the brakes" in search of "coexistence" both with one's own people and

and with

the outside world. Stalin was determined to prevent this under any circumstances, mistakenly believing that his students were

incapable of going against his will. But the first organizational plenum of the Central Committee, elected at the Twentieth Congress, proved the opposite.

According to the unwritten party tradition, the organizational plenum of the new Central Committee takes place even during the work of the congress and the results (elections of the Politburo, Secretariat and General Secretary) are reported to the last meeting of the congress. This law was first violated. The plenum of the new Central Committee takes place two days after the closing of the 20th Congress, namely, on October 16, 1952. With careful

observation, one could notice that this unusual precedent was associated with the difficulties of creating the executive bodies

of the Central Committee. Subsequently, it became known that Stalin, who defiantly ignored the working meetings of the 20th Congress (of the eighteen meetings, he attended only two - the first and the last - staying at them for several minutes),

was extremely active at the plenum of the Central Committee. Stalin developed a new scheme for organizing the Central

Committee and its

executive bodies. He proposed to the 20th Congress to double the membership and candidate composition of the Central Committee:

125 members and 111 candidate members of the Central Committee were elected. Now the plenum of the Central Committee He

proposed, as if observing symmetry, to elect 25 people to the membership of the Presidium (Politburo), and 11 to the candidate staff.

But it was not a matter of the percentage rate and not the desire

symmetry - Stalin mixed his "impious" adherents from the old Politburo with the "virgin lands" rushing to the top from the regional estates of the party. At a distance, mesmerized by the "genius of the father" and the sanctity of his will, the party "virgin lands" were supposed to be an instrument for the destruction of the "wicked". Whether they were aware of their

intended role is irrelevant. Another thing is important - the old members of the Politburo called that this was Stalin's goal. Then they took

steps to frustrate this plan. What measures, we will see later, here we will only cite the statement that the Central Committee, through the

mouth of Khrushchev, made to the Twentieth Congress: "Stalin, obviously, intended to do away with all the old members of the

Politburo. He often said that

members

The Politburo must be replaced by new people."

But why it was necessary to expand the composition of the Presidium (Politburo): "His proposal after

XX Congress of

election of 25 people to the Presidium of the Central Committee was sent to ensure that

remove all the old members from the Politburo and bring in people with less experience who would exalt Stalin in every possible way. It can be assumed that it was  
Also  
intention in the future to liquidate the old members of the Politburo..." (N. S. Khrushchev, "Report at a closed session of the 20th Congress of the CPSU", p. 58).

This message is of decisive importance for revealing the inner motives of the behavior of the old members of the Politburo as a compact group within the  
new Presidium, when each of  
them  
I was convinced, following Beria and Malenkov, that Stalin was taking the debate to another plane -

to be or not to be. If to be Stalin, then not to be him, not only politically, but also physically. The inexorable logic of Stalin in such situations did not call for half measures.

How to stop Stalin? The old members of the Politburo are not yet raising this question, but Stalin is persistently pushing them towards this by his actions.

In the former Politburo, besides Stalin, there were 10 members. During the election of the new Presidium of the Central Committee, Stalin challenged 6 members out of 10. Moreover, he challenged even those who were more likely to be  
ready  
to voluntarily expose their heads to the bullets of the Chekists than to raise a hand against Stalin,  
—

Molotov, Voroshilov, Kaganovich, Andreev. About the behavior of the other two, also allotted by Stalin - Mikoyan to Kosygin - of course, one cannot speak with the same confidence.

How did Stalin motivate his rejection of such devoted and well-deserved comrades-in-arms?

Time will pass, and historians, having gained access to the archives of the Central Committee of that era, will answer this question. Always talkative Khrushchev, unfortunately, Stalin's motives passed over in silence. He limited himself to the following message:

"Due to Stalin's extraordinary suspicion, he even had the absurd and ridiculous idea that Voroshilov was an English agent ... A special installation was even made in Voroshilov's house, allowing him to eavesdrop on what was said there. By his sole decision, Stalin removed another person from work  
in the Politburo - Andrei Andreevich Andreev. This was one of the most unbridled manifestations of arbitrariness. Let us recall the first plenum of the Central Committee after the 20th Party Congress, when in his speech Stalin, describing Vyacheslav Mikhailovich Molotov and Anastas Ivanovich Mikoyan,

expressed  
the idea that these two old workers of our Party are guilty of some kind of

misdeemeanors. The possibility is not ruled out that if Stalin had remained at the helm for a few more months, Comrades Molotov and Mikoyan probably would not have been able to make speeches at today's congress" (ibid., p. 54).

After the just-carried out trial of America's "Zionist spies" led by



Lozovsky

and Molotova Stalin saw Zionist conspirators everywhere. Such a conspirator in his

every Jew was in his eyes, regardless of whether he was a communist or not, moreover, every Russian communist leader

was one, if he was married to a Jewess. Their "genealogical

tables" Stalin expanded to the second and third tribes in the genealogy of the communists, looking for Jewish grandparents

or grandchildren from them. So, Khrushchev's granddaughter from a Jewish mother was found, Beria's mother, allegedly a Georgian Jewess, Malenkov's daughter married to a Jew.

When Stalin, reminding the plenum of the Central Committee of the "Leningrad case", "Zionist case", "Georgian

case", began to dismantle the members of the Politburo by bones, delving into their historical, political and genealogical sins, it turned out: out of 11 members of the Politburo 5 turned out to be

Jewish relatives (Molotov, Malenkov, Voroshilov, Khrushchev, Andreev), one - a Jew (Kaganovich), one - "half-

Jew" (Beria), two - involved in the "Leningrad mafia" (Kosygin and Mikoyan; the son of the latter was married to the daughter of Kuznetsov), only one person

turned out to be clean - harmless and colorless Bulganin.

During Stalin's attacks against his comrades-in-arms, none of them knew what new trick was being prepared for the one

about whom, it seems, he did not say anything at the plenum: Beria.

At the Twentieth Congress, Beria rehabilitated himself for the "Georgian cause", but only before the congress, which by no means meant before Stalin.

In Prague and Warsaw, two political trials were being prepared over the communist leaders of these countries,

whom Beria personally saved during the conflict with Tito, as well as the trial of the Titoists in Bulgaria and Hungary, who

also still enjoyed the support of Beria. These leaders rescued by Beria now turned out to be "Zionists": the general

secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia Slansky (a Jew) and the general secretary

of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Poland Gomulka (married to a Jewess). Thus, the circle of a large

international conspiracy of the Zionists of America, the USSR and Eastern Europe against communism was closed (here Stalin acted exactly according to the recipe of Hitler, who only talked about the "conspiracy of world Jewry").

The absurdity of the concept of a "Jewish conspiracy" and digging into the genealogy is clearly revealed in the fact that

Stalin himself had Jewish relatives (a grandson named Joseph in his honor). The author of the biography, L.P. Beria,

dedicated the following significant lines to this trick of Stalin against Beria: "The first target of the attack against Beria's positions was Czechoslovakia. Beria provided all the key positions of power there to his allies. After

the assassination of Masaryk and the death of Beneš Beria ruled this highly industrialized and civilized country through his henchmen in the Czech secret police in such a way as

This

found it necessary in their own interests. As soon as Ignatiev became the head of state security, he hit the Beria bastion in Czechoslovakia. Suddenly a wave rolled

arrests, which included officials of the Soviet apparatus in Prague, as well as high-ranking officials of the secret police of Czechoslovakia, who worked under the leadership of Beria. Beria's henchmen were the main victims of the purge. The officials were arrested on charges of espionage, sabotage, sabotage and treason, but since they were Beria's people, the accusation against them indirectly struck Beria as well. However, one striking feature characterizes this whole action. Almost all those arrested are tall

ranks by

led by their leader Rudolf Slansky (whose real name is Zaltsman) - Bedrich Geminder, Rudolf Margolyus, Andre Simon, Arthur London and nine other protégés of Beria

were Jews. Those arrested were also accused of being "Zionists"... The new purge had a typically anti-Semitic flavor and was obviously staged by Stalin" (TV.

Stalin's suspicions against Beria in the "Warsaw case" were even more serious. Information about what role Stalin wanted to ascribe to Beria, if the

"Warsaw affair" succeeds, comes from most

Gomulka (Gomulka dictated to one of his close collaborators documents of the type "KrgazVsVey. Keteletz" - "My 14 years." embassy in Canada).

From the very first days after the war, Poland was ruled by three people - Bierut, chairman of the Central Committee of the Polish Communist Party (Gomulka calls him a pet of the NKVD), member of the Politburo and head of the state security organs Yakub Berman (the same "pet of the NKVD") and the first secretary of the Central Committee of Gomulka, during war led the fight

bu Polish communists in the rear of Poland against the Germans. The first two were Beria's personal henchmen, but Stalin apparently decided to discredit Bierut and Beria by arresting and testifying against them by Berman and Gomulka.

What testimony did Stalin want to have? He wanted to know only one thing: Beria plotted against Stalin and dragged his Polish proteges into this business.

Let's listen to Gomulka himself: "Berut was very afraid of Berman, believing that during the investigation or trial

can tell

something very compromising about him. So, as if Beria at one time plotted against Stalin, and allegedly Berut was involved in this matter. I'm not quite sure about this, but that's how the case was presented to me. Be that as it may, Bierut was very protective of Berman, and at the same time of me, for I had to be the first to appear before the court. This is how it was made

script ... Berut dragged out the case as best he could, even resorting to sending to Moscow false

information. For example, he assured me that I was mortally ill... Berut pulled as long as he could,

and in the end Stalin's death saved the situation" (ibid.).

All this - both the Czech interrogations and the Warsaw "scenarios" - came to Beria, because other of his proteges interrogated the arrested henchmen of Beria. Here Stalin is against his will hit

into a vicious circle. And what Beria knew, Malenkov also knew, who in the strongest way connected his fate with him. Stalin, not without anxiety,

watched their close rapprochement.

Khrushchev and Alliluyeva are unanimous in emphasizing the adhesion between Beria and Malenkov. When they defiantly retired at some regular banquet from the rest of the Politburo members, Stalin nodded in their direction and said, according to Khrushchev: two rogues, two inseparable swindlers!

Each of them knew that if Stalin killed one, he would definitely kill the other. And their spike was the best way to insure your life from Stalin. This soldering saved

the life of the old members of the Politburo as well. They were convinced of this at the last Stalinist plenum.

Here we come to the most mysterious problem: Stalin challenged at least six

members of the old Politburo, so why were the most important of them (Molotov, Voroshilov, Mikoyan, Kaganovich) still elected members of the new

Politburo (Presidium)? Stalin gave them

withdrawal before the plenum of the Central Committee, which consisted of 236 members and a candidate

comrade Of these, only 20-25 people really knew Stalin, and for the rest he was an infallible god. Why didn't these others agree with Stalin's

challenge? The established election procedure was as follows: the composition of the Central Committee is elected by ballots by secret ballot, they are checked by the counting commission elected by the congress, they are recorded and the results are reported to the congress, the ballots

are not destroyed, but transferred for storage along with the minutes of the congress to the secret archive of the Central Committee. The executive bodies

of the Central Committee: the Politburo, the Secretariat, the General Secretary and the Chairman of the Party Control Committee under the Central

Committee, are elected by open vote, if there is no demand from the Plenum to hold these elections by secret

voting.

During this open or secret vote, the plenum of the Central Committee disavows Stalin

And

defiantly selects the people assigned to them in the Presidium (Politburo).

That Stalin rejected them is known from the report of the Central Committee at the Twentieth Congress, but that they were nevertheless

elected, we learned from the official report on the plenum of the Central Committee (Pravda, 10/17/52). This was Stalin's first historic defeat in his party.

How could this happen? How did Stalin react?

Stalin did not give up. He decided, in chess terms, to immediately remove the knight from

boards

of the "old guard" and thus rectify their position. He turned to the Presidium: since the Presidium of the Central Committee is very cumbersome (25

members and 11 candidates), it is necessary to choose from

his

environment a small body for operational work mainly from young, energetic members of the Presidium. Such a body should have been the Bureau of the Presidium, in general, the charter

Not

provided.

Stalin's goal is clear - to bypass Voroshilov, Molotov, Kaganovich and Mikoyan. But he succeeds only partially: a Bureau of 9 people is elected, in which the

old members of the Politburo

constitute

majority: Malenkov, Beria, Khrushchev, Bulganin, Voroshilov, Kaganovich against two "young" - Pervukhin and Saburov - and Stalin himself

299). Molotov and Mikoyan remained outside the Bureau. The bureau even in this composition, according to Khrushchev, did not actually function, and all matters

were decided by the five: Stalin, Malenkov, Beria, Khrushchev, Bulganin. Thus, Stalin still excluded Voroshilov and Kaganovich.

How could it happen that Stalin was not able to legally get rid of unwanted persons? How could the plenum

The Central Committee does not follow its "father and teacher"? Did the members of the plenum of the Central Committee really not know that Stalin

physically destroyed 70 percent of the plenum of the Central Committee in 1934 for resisting the proposal to judge Bukharin and Rykov? They knew this, of course. But they also knew a more important thing: by the time of the congress, power was no longer with Stalin, but with the apparatus headed by

Malenkov and

Beria. Now it was not Stalin who controlled the apparatus, but the apparatus controlled him. Stalin was God as long as the party and police apparatus was in his

hands, and now the members of the Central Committee saw that "God has de facto been overthrown.

Having exhausted all other means, Stalin finally decided to go for broke. An event took place that was accurately recorded in the documents available to

us, but remained completely unnoticed in

Literature about Stalin. Stalin submitted to the same plenum of the Central Committee an application for his release.

from

the post of general secretary of the Central Committee, firstly, being convinced that it would not be accepted, and secondly, in order to check the attitude of his

closest associates and students to this.

But the incredible happened: the plenum accepted Stalin's resignation!

This was the second historical defeat of Stalin.

The fact that Stalin filed such a statement, we know from the two from each other not dependent

sources: from Svetlana Alliluyeva and from the former Minister of the Navy of the USSR, Admiral N. G. Kuznetsov.

In the book "Twenty Letters to a Friend", Alliluyeva writes: "Probably, due to illness, he (Stalin. A. A.) twice after the 20th Congress

— (October 1952) declared to the Central Committee about his desire to leave

V

resignation. This fact is well known to the members of the Central Committee elected at the Twentieth Congress" (p. 191).

In her second book, "Only One Year," she writes on the same topic: "According to his former translator V.N. Pavlov, who was

elected to the Central Committee at the Twentieth Congress, at the end of 1952, his father twice asked the new

composition of the Central Committee to resign. Everyone answered in unison that it was impossible ... I waited whether he

other answers from this slender choir? Or suspected someone who would express

his consent

replace?.. And did he really want to resign? (p. 340).

We will see later that Alliluyeva is mistaken in thinking that his resignation was not accepted.

Admiral Kuznetsov also writes about this statement of Stalin, adding that the Central Committee accepted his resignation

only partially, but clearly confusing what this "partially" expressed. Here are his words:

"I heard an official request for his (Stalin - A.A.) partial release later, at the Plenum of the Central Committee of the CPSU, after

the 20th Party Congress. Then Stalin was relieved of the post of Minister of Defense, but he nevertheless decided to leave the

main posts in the Central Committee of the Party and the Council of Ministers

behind

yourself" (see: "Neva", 1965, No. 5, p. 161).

Kuznetsov is mistaken in one thing, and even grossly, because it is known that Stalin resigned from the post of Minister of

the Armed Forces of the USSR back in 1947, transferring this post to Bulganin.

How was the resignation? Two documents slipped past the censorship, from which it is clear that Stalin's "partial release"

was expressed in the acceptance of his resignation from the post of General Secretary with

retaining for him the post of one of the secretaries of the Central Committee and chairman of the Council of Ministers.

Even during the first post-Stalinist "collective leadership", the Encyclopedic Dictionary was published, where the following is directly and unambiguously written in Stalin's biography: "After the XT Party Congress, on April 3, 1922, the plenum of

the Central Committee of the Party, at the suggestion of V.I.

Lenin elected I. V. Stalin General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Party. I. V. Stalin worked in this post until October

1952, and then until the end of his life he was secretary

Central Committee "(my discharge. - A. 2.) (Encyclopedic Dictionary in 3 volumes. M. 1955, vol. Sh, p. 310).

The same is repeated in the reference apparatus of the Complete Works of Lenin, which came out under the second, Brezhnev's "collective leadership." It says: "Stalin ... From 1922 to 1952 —

General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Party, then Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU "(V. I. Lenin, Complete Works, vol. 44, p. 651).

There is no random slip of the tongue here. These documents leave no doubt that Stalin after

October plenum of the Central Committee in 1952 ceased to be general secretary, and was only one of its ten secretaries.

Who took his place? There is no indication of this in the memoirs of contemporaries, neither in

official documents of the party, but there was no secret - the place of Stalin in the Secretariat of the Central Committee was taken, of course, by Malenkov. Only now he was called not the General Secretary, but the First Secretary of the Central Committee. The power of Stalin passed to his disciples now legally. Of course, Stalin remained the leader of the party; when listing the members of the Presidium and the Secretariat of the Central Committee,

his name is named first, outside the alphabet. But now he's so

vy, which is entirely dependent on the latter. Stalin would not have been himself if he had come to terms with this. He will provoke the next crisis, trying to regain his former unlimited power.

#### THE DESTRUCTION OF THE "INTERNAL OFFICE"

An analysis of subsequent events shows that the new Minister of State Security, S. D. Ignatiev, played a dual role: he diligently carried out Stalin's orders

and carefully communicated them to those against whom they were directed - Malenkov, Beria, Khrushchev. This was not a betrayal, but a kind of self-

insurance for Ignatiev. He knew that none of the ministers of state security who killed people on Stalin's orders died a natural death.

After they completed the

task, Stalin also eliminated them. So Menzhinsky, Yagoda, Yezhov died. So now Abakumov is sitting, Beria is next in line, and after Beria Stalin liquidates him,

Ignatiev. Khrushchev told the 20th Congress about Ignatiev's double game, for example, in the "doctors' case". "On

this

At the congress," said Khrushchev, "the former Minister of State Security, Comrade Ignatiev, is present as a delegate. Stalin sharply told him: "If you do not get

the recognition of doctors, we will shorten you by the head" (N. S. Khrushchev, "Report at a closed meeting of the 20th Congress of the CPSU, p. 44).

Knowing that Stalin, under all conditions, would "shorten him by the head," Ignatiev began to pursue a dual policy. Otherwise, he would not have been at the congress,

which was led by the old Politburo in

led by

Khrushchev, Bulganin, Malenkov. He, in fact, turned out to be the only surviving leading Chekist from Stalin's entourage: his deputy Ryumin was shot, his predecessor Minister of State Security Abakumov and all his assistants were shot, Abakumov's predecessor Minister of State Security Merkulov and all his assistants were shot, Beria and all his assistants were shot, the ministers were liquidated Internal Affairs and State Security Kruglov and Serov and all their

assistants, but Ignatiev remained alive (in 1974, on his seventieth birthday, he even received an order).

When, after the death of Stalin, Beria merged the ministries of state security and internal affairs into one Ministry of Internal Affairs

The USSR itself headed it, then Ignatiev received only a promotion - he was made secretary of the CPSU Central Committee for state security!

Such an amazing ability of self-preservation, the ability to adapt to the situation and bypass underwater reefs, and even play with such fire as Stalin, could only

be possessed by an exceptionally talented party apparatchik. They turned out to be Ignatiev. For more than a quarter of a century he

worked within the party apparatus at all levels: in the region (Bashkiria), in the republics (Uzbekistan and Belarus), in the center (Central Committee of the CPSU). He was

more devoted to the apparatus than to persons, even such as Stalin. He was not an opportunist, but a fanatic of the apparatus. This is probably the secret.

his

salvation.

Naturally, even in the Ministry of State Security, he felt that he was not a professional Chekist, but a resident of the party apparatus, his envoy and

executor of his will. If the interests of the secret police came into conflict with the interests of the party apparatus, then people like Ignatiev took the side of the party, and

the party was personified by the party apparatus. However

personal

Stalin's dictatorship demanded that not the party control the police, but rather that the police control the party. And now that Stalin has conceived a new purge against

both the Party and

against the police, he unwittingly provoked the unity of the old police cadres with the old party apparatchiks, as a result of which they slipped him the Minister of

Security

Ignatiev.

Stalin accepted the new head of the police in the belief that he would reforge him in his own image and likeness. And I was wrong. Ignatiev turned out to be a true

Stalinist: a double-dealer. Because of this, Ignatiev was an ideal tool in an ideal place to organize a conspiracy against Stalin.

Now our presentation enters an area where, along with official data, indirect evidence also plays an important role.

According to Khrushchev (see: KAgazVsVey. Ketemerz, vo1. 1, p. 305), the "doctors-conspirators" had been under arrest since the time of the Twentieth Congress (October 1952); The "script" in the Gomułka case was also already famous.

In November of the same year, Beria's henchmen were tried in Czechoslovakia (Slansky's trial); Intense interrogations of the Berievites were going on in Tbilisi.

The very first reports of Ignatiev about the course of interrogations of doctors showed that Stalin's plans were directed not only against Beria and his Chekists, but also against the entire Politburo.

The commentator on Khrushchev's memoirs, Edward Crankshaw, quite rightly writes that "Stalin's last purge was directed against his closest colleagues, and primarily against Beria" (Kinasveu. Ketetes, v0], 1, p. 301). All this led to Beria's decision to propose to Stalin that he resign from all his posts.

On the way to the presentation, and even more so to the implementation of such a decision, however, there were Very

serious obstacles, without overcoming which Stalin was invulnerable. This is his "inner office" headed by General Poskrebyshv, his bodyguards headed

by General Vlasik, the commandant's office of the Kremlin headed by General Kosynkin. Beria was well aware that Stalin could be turned into a political corpse only through the physical corpses of these servants devoted to him.

There were two more problems: firstly, where to offer Stalin his resignation - in the Kremlin, at his dacha near Moscow or at his dacha on the Black Sea coast (as was later done with Khrushchev); secondly, which of the members of the Presidium of the Central Committee can be included in the "delegation" to Stalin.

It was known who would not go to Stalin with such a demand: Molotov, Voroshilov, Kaganovich, Mikoyan - they would not go because of their past personal connections or because of cowardice. The new members of the Presidium generally disappear - there was a great danger that one of them would betray the whole plan.

There remain those whom Khrushchev calls the ruling inner circle of the new Bureau, which, in addition to Stalin, included only members of the unspoken four: Beria, Malenkov, Khrushchev and Bulganin, plus the protege of this four - Ignatiev. Ironically, Stalin only let them in.

Khrushchev's data is also confirmed by Alliluyeva's memoirs: "Most recently, ordinary people (at Stalin's dacha - A.A.) were: Beria, Malenkov, Bulganin, Mikoyan. Khrushchev also appeared. Since 1949, after the arrest of his wife, Molotov was practically out of work, and even during the days of his father's illness he was not called" ("Twenty Letters to a Friend", p. 192).



The safest place for Stalin to demand his resignation, of course, was the Black Sea coast of Georgia, far from Moscow. However, after the creation of the "Mingrelian case", Stalin was afraid of his fellow countrymen and stopped going there on vacation. Alliluyeva reports: "The last time he lived especially solitary; trip south in the autumn of 1951 was the last" (ibid.,

p. 190). So the south fell away. The Kremlin and the dacha near Moscow remained. The Kremlin impressed from the legal side - as the residence of the state and the party. All legal acts must come from here. But if Stalin refused to accept the demand for his resignation, then at the touch of a button he would have raised the alarm not only in the Kremlin, but also in Moscow and throughout the country: the communication here was perfect. Therefore, the Kremlin also fell away. All that remained was Kuntsevo, Stalin's dacha near Moscow.

Kuntsevo was also dangerous, but only as long as Stalin's "inner office" operated flawlessly. Deprive Stalin of this "cabinet", and then he is in your hands - that was Beria's plan. It was necessary to remove from Stalin his personal doctor, the head of his personal bodyguard, the head of his personal office, his representative in the Kremlin, the commandant of the Kremlin. They can

was removed only by the hands of Stalin himself. Here Beria was in his element.

You have no direct evidence, but there is no doubt that it was Beria who organized the disappearance of Stalin's secret documents from Poskrebyshchev's bureau, which Khrushchev tells about (see: KvgazveVeu. Ketetes, uo). 1, pp. 292 - 293). Probably, Beria managed to steal from Poskrebyshchev something more secret than Stalin's economic manuscripts, which Khrushchev speaks about. Otherwise, Stalin's statement would not have been clear: "I convicted Poskrebyshchev of losing secret material. Nobody else could do it. The duck of secret documents went through Poskrebyshchev. He gave away the secrets" (ibid., p. 292). Stalin immediately removed Poskrebyshchev, but did not have time to shoot him.

It was much easier to direct Stalin's anger against General Vlasik. As a professional Chekist, he was entirely in the hands of Beria, thanks to whom he stayed with Stalin so many years.

But it probably could not have been used against Stalin, but it turned out possible  
provoke Stalin into his arrest, which Beria did. Alliluyeva writes:

"It must be said that at this most recent time even the father's longtime close associates were in disgrace: the

unchanging Vlasik went to prison in the winter of 1952, and at the same time his personal secretary Poskrebyshchev, who had served him for about 20 years, was dismissed" ("Twenty Letters to a Friend" , p. 192).

In the winter of 1952, this means in December 1952, since in October 1952 Poskrebyshev spoke at the Twentieth Party Congress and was elected a member of the Central Committee there. Let's add

right there: the places vacated by Poskrebyshev, Vlasik and their assistants were taken by people put forward there through Ignatiev by the "inner circle" - the four.

There are serious reasons to believe that Stalin's personal doctor Vinogradov and the chief

The medical and sanitary department of the Kremlin Yegorov was also arrested according to Beria's plan. According to the same plan, the Minister of Health of the USSR Smirnov, who had access

To

Stalin (in his place was appointed an unknown person in the party, but the well-known Beria doctor Tretyakov).

One of the leaders of the Comintern, Franz Borkenau, on the fresh traces of the arrest of the Kremlin doctors,

suggested that the arrest of Stalin's personal doctors means a conspiracy against him by his comrades-in-arms, led by Malenkov - they want to assign their doctors to Stalin in order to decide his fate (see: "KVeshizVeg MegKig", 01/23/53).

Today it can definitely be argued that the doctors from the group of Academician Vinogradov (Stalin's life doctor) were arrested on the denunciation of Beria's sex woman, doctor Timashchuk, but Stalin

turned these arrests against Beria himself, declaring the doctors "long-standing English

spies "(like Beria!) According to the denunciation of Marshal Konev (see: KbgazVsveu. Vetetetb, y0]. P, p. 305).

Stalin's housekeeper Valentina Vasilievna spoke about Stalin's reaction to the arrest of doctors. So, immediately after the arrest of Stalin's personal doctors, they were talked about at Stalin's dinner table in

the presence of Beria, Malenkov, Khrushchev, Bulganin. Alliluyeva writes:

"The Doctors' Plot took place in the last winter of his life. Valentina Vasilievna told me later that my father was very upset by the turn of events. She heard it discussed at the table during dinner. She served on the table, as always. Father said he didn't believe

in their

"dishonesty", that this cannot be - after all, the denunciations of Dr. Timashchuk served as "proof", - all those present, as usual in such cases, were silent ... "( "Twenty Letters to

friend", p. 192).

Alliluyeva thinks that Valentina Vasilievna is biased and defends her father, but adds: "Still, you need to listen to what she says and extract some sensible things from these stories.

grains, since she was in her father's house for the last 18 years, and I rarely visited him" (ibid.). Did Stalin himself allow Beria to conspire against himself? Not only allowed, but very

feared him just after the war. Here is Khrushchev's story: "After the war, Beria became member Politburo, and Stalin began to worry

live about his growing influence. Moreover, Stalin began to fear him. I didn't know then what the reasons for this were, but later, when Beria's entire machine for the destruction of people was revealed, everything became clear. The practical means to achieve Stalin's goals were in the hands of Beria. Stalin realized that if Beria is able to destroy any person whom he points his finger at, then he, Beria, can destroy any other person of his own choice. Stalin was afraid that he would turn out to be the first person chosen by Beria himself "(KBgazNeVeu. Vetevets, v01. 1, p. 335).

All tyrants known to us from history were suspicious, cowardly, always imagined themselves V

danger, they themselves developed the most complicated rules for ensuring their personal safety, they threw out various tricks to test the devotion of others. That people called

delusions of persecution, was in fact their surest preventive weapon against possible conspirators. Stalin surpassed all his predecessors in this respect as well. First of all, he deprived potential conspirators of their favorite time of reprisal against tyrants - night. Stalin was the only tyrant in history who did not sleep at night, but worked or had fun in the company of his comrades-in-arms in his dacha. I went to bed at four or five in the morning and got up at eleven or twelve in the afternoon. The entire gigantic party and state machine of the country also adapted to this mode of operation.

Stalin was also the only ruler who did not live in the official residence allotted to him - in the Kremlin. The whole country thought that Stalin lived in that three-room apartment in the building of the former Senate in the Kremlin, which was described by Henri Barbusse, but in fact he lived in a fortress isolated from the outside world, hidden in the forest, surrounded by a high fence near Moscow, which was called Near Dacha in Kuntsevo.

Yes, not a single tyrant in history was so reliably guarded as Stalin under Poskrebyshchev and Vlasik, and not a single retinue was as devoted to his master as Stalin's (that's why his illiterate cooks became generals, and personal guards eventually became

ministers - Abakumov, Merkulov, Kruglov).

The order of visiting Stalin not only by ministers, but also by members of the Politburo was simply insulting - everyone who went to Stalin, regardless of rank and rank, had to

be searched by his bodyguards. On

how strict Stalin's bodyguard was, shows, for example, the case with Molotov. One day, returning from an important trip to London, Molotov went directly from the airfield with a report to Stalin in the Kremlin. Security found a pistol in Molotov's

pocket  
and not

very politely pulled him out. Molotov complained to Stalin, but Stalin maintained his

protection (see: Utsug A [Tehapagou. T'Ve Ktetip. G.opaop. 1963, p. 322). Just as strict was the order of protection and the dacha-fortress of Stalin ...

Khrushchev reports that Beria participated in the selection of servants and Stalin's guards. There was a time when Beria surrounded

Stalin only with Georgians. Stalin drew attention to this and accused Beria that he believed only the Georgians, while the

Russians were no less devoted to him, Stalin. Beria had to replace the guards. However, Beria's influence on Stalin's

new guard was

great.

Khrushchev notes: "Even after the expulsion of the Georgians, Beria continued to control Stalin's retinue. Beria worked for the

Cheka for so long that he knew all the Chekists. They all sought the favor of Beria, and it was easy for Beria to use them for his own

purposes. Therefore, Stalin could not even trust his Russian retinue, including the life guards" (KVgisbsVeu. Vetetes, vo1. 1, p. 336).

However, while Poskrebyshev was at the head of the "inner cabinet", and Vlasik was at the head of the guards, it would not

be so easy for Beria to use Stalin's guards "for his own purposes." But, succumbing to provocation, Stalin defeated his entire

"inner cabinet". It was a suicidal act on his part.

It is easy to imagine how important the four attached to the fact that the place of Poskrebyshev was taken by a person who was

able to isolate Stalin from the outside world and information and did not know why this should be done (the conspirators had many such unwitting performers). Poskrebyshev's position was temporarily taken by the eldest after him in the "cabinet" -

Vladimir Naumovich Chernukha, a Siberian, party member since 1918, an active participant in the civil war, with whom Poskrebyshev began his Bolshevik career in Ufa and whom

He

brought to the "Secretariat of Comrade Stalin" in 1925. Chernukha was a loyal, but limited apparatchik from the breed of clerical rats. He clearly didn't fit the role.

new

Poskrebyshev, and there were no others near Stalin. This is probably why Stalin decided to look for a new

assistant outside the Central Committee apparatus. From the new chief of the "cabinet"

Stalin required, in addition to strong-willed qualities and devotion, a comprehensive knowledge of the functioning of the party-Chekist machine, military order and thorough theoretical training. And such a person was very soon found: the first secretary

Leningrad City Committee of the CPSU Vladimir Nikiforovich Malin. This was the candidate with the highest connections - he was known from his previous work at least by the following members of the Presidium of the Central Committee of the CPSU: Andrianov, Ponomarenko, Ignatiev, Malenkov and Beria.

Malin was one of those Malenkovites who came to the party apparatus as a result of the "great purge". By the beginning of the war, Malenkov

made him secretary of the Central Committee of Belarus, during the war he was first appointed a member of the Army Military Council with

the rank of general, then deputy

chief of the Central headquarters of the partisan movement at the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command (Ponomarenko was the chief of staff). It is highly probable that in this position Malin also came into contact with Stalin during regular reports on partisan affairs, but there is no doubt that, by the nature of his service, Malin had close contact with Beria. After the war, he was again

appointed, together with Ponomarenko and the future Minister of State Security Ignatiev, one of the secretaries of the Central Committee

of Belarus. When in 1948 Ponomarenko was appointed secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU, Malin asked to study at the graduate school of the Academy of Social Sciences under the Central Committee. He graduated from it in 1949 ahead of schedule, receiving the degree of candidate of sciences. In the same year, when the defeat of the Zhdanovites began, Malenkov sent his

most trusted people to Leningrad: Andrianov, the first secretary of the Leningrad regional committee and Malin, the first secretary of the

Leningrad city committee. It was from this post at the end of 1952 that Malin moved to Poskrebyshev's chair, of course, without his reputation as a

formidable temporary worker, but powerful enough to play the role intended for him - to accurately report to Malenkov

every order and

movement of Stalin, and smart enough to

do not claim independence under these conditions.

As soon as Stalin published the famous article of January 13, 1953, about the arrest of the Kremlin doctors, all guesswork about the plans of the dictator ended. Now everyone was waiting

- from

members of the Politburo and to ordinary Soviet citizens - the "worst case": a "stormy, all-destroying, merciless" purge, which,

as in 1937,

should

carry away millions of people to prisons, camps and the next world, so that Stalin would feel even safer in his dacha-fortress. Such was

Zagradin Khrushchev's impression after visiting Stalin's dacha-fortress in Kuntsevo. If this did not happen, if hundreds of thousands

people survived, if millions were saved from being sent to concentration camps, then this is the merit of the most hated person in the USSR after Stalin

- Beria ...

## THE LAST DAYS OF STALIN

On a fateful day for himself, January 13, 1953, Stalin published the TASS Chronicle - about

disclosure by state security agencies of "a terrorist group of doctors whose goal was to shorten the lives of active workers in the Soviet Union through sabotage treatment." This publication just shortened the life of Stalin himself.

In order to understand how and why this happened, we must ask ourselves: why did Stalin need a "doctors' case"? To this, with the utmost clarity and an oversight not characteristic of him answered

Stalin himself in an article published on the same 13th, "Vainous spies and murderers under the guise of medical professors." The article is not signed,

but by the specific features of the language and style, by the manner of argumentation, it is clear that its author was Stalin himself.

The "Chronicle ..." says that "doctors-pests" worked on the instructions of two foreign intelligence agencies: American (professor doctors Vovsi M.S., Kogan B.B., Feldman A.I., Grinshtein A.M. , Etinger Ya. G. and others) and English (academician Vinogradov V. N., professors doctors Kogan M. B., Egorov P.

I.). All those arrested, except for Vinogradov and Yegorov, are Jews. All of them are doctors of the Kremlin polyclinic and, as such, are the life doctors of members of the Politburo, the government

And

senior military officials. All the Jews of the first group were "recruited" into American intelligence through the international Jewish bourgeois-nationalist organization "Joint", posing as a charitable organization, and members of Vinogradov's group "turned out to be

long-time agents of British intelligence.

"Chronicle ..." reported on the admission of doctors that they had killed "by wrecking treatment"

secretaries of the Central Committee Zhdanov and Shcherbakov, they wanted to kill marshals Vasilevsky, Govorov and Konev, army general Shtemenko, hell

Miral Levchenko. Professor Vovsi allegedly told the investigation that he had received a directive from the Zionists from the "Joint" "on the extermination of the leading cadres of the USSR" (note that the most important marshals - Zhukov and Bulganin, as well as the most important party

figures - Malenkov, Beria, Khrushchev - are not among the intended victims ).

If Stalin had limited himself to this "Chronicle ...", then one would have thought that this only

another explosion of anti-Semitism and the "doctors' case" is just a variant of the "Zionist case". But with an article in Pravda (of the same January 13), Stalin

prematurely (and therefore carelessly) revealed his cards: the case of the life doctors of the Politburo members looked like the case of the Politburo itself.

Stalin's always rich criminal fantasy in the "doctors' case" turned out to be surprisingly scanty: he simply pulled out of the archive the case of Bukharin,

Rykov, Yagoda and the group of Kremlin "pests" suing with them (Professor Pletnev, doctors of medicine Levin,

Maksimov and Kazakov), replaced the old names with new ones, modernized the prosecution

And

slipped it to the Politburo. Moreover, Stalin again launched his political

the philosophy of that time about classes and the class struggle under socialism, about "right-wing opportunists", about "enemies of the people", who multiply the more, the more successes socialism has. For the first time, he also pulled out the then used method of admitting doctors to the murder (Pletnev, Levin, Maksimov and Kazakov also confessed that, on the instructions of foreign intelligence agents, former members of the Politburo Rykov, Bukharin, head of the NKVD Yagoda, they killed Politburo member Kuibyshev, member of the Central Committee Menzhinsky by means of sabotage treatment and "proletarian" writer Maxim Gorky).

Stalin was so blind in his anger against the Politburo or so decrepit mentally that he no longer saw how he was sewing a new black deed with old white threads: "... some people conclude that the danger of sabotage, espionage has now been removed ... But So

only right-wing opportunists, people who adhere to the anti-Marxist point of view of the "fading out" of the class struggle, can think and reason. They do not or cannot understand that our

successes do not lead to a fading, but to an intensification of the struggle, that the more successful our advance is, the sharper will be the struggle of the enemies of the people" ("Pravda", 13.01.53).

Who are these anonymous "right opportunists"? Of course, not collective farmers and not even "doctors pests", but members of the Soviet government and heads of state security agencies, who, like the "right opportunists" Bukharin,

Rykov and Yagoda, can easily be brought under the KGB bullets.

However, Stalin himself directly indicates the address of the desired "enemies of the people":

1) "Some of our Soviet bodies and their leaders have lost their vigilance, they have become infected with mouthwash";

2) "State security agencies did not uncover in time the wrecking, terrorist organization among doctors."

Stalin does not think that he is mediocrely repeating the past trick, putting Kremlin doctors on trial. He considers their "sabotage" almost a regularity: "... history has already knows

examples when vile murderers and traitors to the Motherland acted under the guise of doctors, like the "doctors" Levin, Pletnev, who, on the instructions of the enemies of the Soviet Union, killed the great Russian writer A. M. Gorky,

prominent figures of the Soviet state V. V. Kuibyshev and V. R. Menzhinsky.

Levin was then Stalin's personal physician, just as Vinogradov is now. Both wanted to kill

Stalin on the instructions of "right-wing opportunists" and "enemies of the people" who are in the service of foreign intelligence services. Stalin survived only thanks to his own vigilance, and the NKVD

neither

then (Yagoda), not now (Beria) did not open in time "a wrecking, terrorist organization among doctors."

Why?

Yagoda - because he himself turned out to be both a "right opportunist" and an "enemy of the people", and why Beria was not opened - Stalin wants to find out now.

Stalin ends the article with a stern warning: "The Soviet people, with anger and indignation, stigmatize the criminal gang of murderers and their foreign masters. Despicable hirelings who sell themselves for dollars and sterling he will crush like a repulsive reptile. As for the inspirers of these mercenaries-killers, they can be sure that retribution will not forget about them and will find a way to them in order to say their weighty word to them" ("Pravda", 01/13/53). This is the language of the Yezhov era, when Stalin "found the way" to the "inspirers" of Levin and Pletnev, when he shot half the Politburo and 70 percent of all members of the Central Committee. Beria

And

Malenkov, Khrushchev and Bulganin, not to mention Molotov and Voroshilov, Mikoyan, Kaganovich and Andreev, knew this

language very well and knew their doom if Stalin remained in power for a few more months. This was also discussed at the 20th Congress of the CPSU:

"Let us remember the case of pest doctors. In fact, there was no "case" other than the statement

female doctor Timashchuk, who, in all likelihood, was influenced or simply ordered by someone (by the way, she was an unofficial employee of the state

security) to write a letter to Stalin... Shortly after the arrest of the doctors, we, members of the Politburo, received protocols in which the doctors confessed their guilt...

in such a way that no one could verify the facts on which the investigation is based... When we reviewed this "case" after Stalin's death, we came to the conclusion that it was fabricated from beginning to end. This shameful "affair" was created by Stalin. Him  
Not

there was enough time, however, to bring it to the end (as he imagined this end)" (N. S. Khrushchev, "Report at a closed meeting of the 20th Congress of the CPSU, p. 44).

How did Stalin imagine this end?

This question was given a clear and categorical answer: "Stalin obviously intended  
do away with

all the old members of the Politburo," was the intention "in the future to liquidate the old members



Politburo" (ibid., p. 58).

With a delay of thirty years, the Politburo pulled out Lenin's "Testament" from the secret archive, where it was proposed to remove Stalin from the post of General Secretary, since he is capable of abusing power.

"This negative feature of Stalin ... in the last years of his life acquired an absolutely intolerable character," states the Politburo (ibid., p. 8).

That's when the members of the Politburo came to the conclusion that Stalin wanted to liquidate them and What

his character became "absolutely intolerant", they decided to give Stalin an ultimatum not

only about the release of doctors, but also about leaving all posts. Only those who still had real power could do this - Beria, Malenkov, Khrushchev and Bulganin, relying on the army (Zhukov, Zakharov, Moskalenko, Sokolovsky, Eremenko) and the police (Ignatiev). provoked

them

the defeat of the "inner cabinet" made it possible to present this ultimatum. The head of the conspirators was undoubtedly Beria.

Let us return briefly to the relationship between Stalin and Beria. We have already cited Khrushchev's story about how Stalin was afraid of Beria and even feared a conspiracy on his part. We also saw that the "Mingrelian case" was directed against Beria. Finally, the "case of doctors" was, first of all, the "case of Beria". Under these circumstances, it seems strange

why Stalin did not do with him the same as with the old members of the Politburo - Molotov, Voroshilov and others, whom he simply forbade to visit his house. After all, Beria visited Stalin at any time of the day or night when he wanted to. Beria visited Stalin's family even under

his

late wife - Nadezhda Alliluyeva. It was she who first warned her husband that Beria was a scoundrel. Svetlana Alliluyeva writes:

"Disgust for this man and a vague fear of him were unanimous in our circle of loved ones. Mom a long time ago (in the 29th year), as my father himself told me, "made scenes, demanding that this person's leg should not be in our house." My father told me this later, when I was already an adult, and explained: "I asked her - what's the matter? Bring the facts! You don't convince me, I don't see the facts. And she only shouted: I don't know what facts you need, but I see that he is a scoundrel. I will not sit at the same table with him. Well, - I told her then - get out! This is my comrade, he is a good security officer, he helped us in Georgia to foresee the uprising of the Mingrelians, I believe him. I need facts, I need facts"" ("Twenty Letters to a Friend", p. 18).

These facts made Stalin change his mind about Beria. Alliluyeva remembered "how she was amazed by her father's words" when one day she stayed overnight with Beria's wife, and "suddenly in the morning

an angry father called and, cursing me with obscene words, shouted: "Now  
same  
go home! I don't trust Beria"" ("Only one year", p. 327).

All this Beria already saw and felt. "Beria was well aware that his fate was in constant danger" (ibid., p. 325). However, having changed his mind about Beria,

Stalin could not immediately get rid of him, and therefore outwardly he did not give himself away. Stalin was not only an excellent conspirator, but also a virtuoso

artist. First enter into the trust of the chosen victim,

and then

strike it with a sudden stunning blow - such was the first rule of his criminal art, both in domestic and foreign policy.

Stalin is trying to come up with something original to disguise the intended blow, but he clearly does not succeed. Perhaps some compensation for his

exhausted ingenuity is the "fraternization" at the more frequent drinking parties in Kuntsevo, where he emphatically gives Beria the role of toastmaster. After all, according to Caucasian customs, while Beria is a toastmaster, he

Maybe

command and Stalin, even in his house.

Stalin did not imagine that he himself could be deceived, nor that this would happen during the next, and last, of his feast.

Stalin liked to substantiate his every crime ideologically; a reference to Lenin, if there is a suitable quotation, the composition of a new dogma, if there is no such quotation. At the heart of this

The ideological justification should have been based on the concept of classes and class struggle. But Lenin, like Marx, explained the historical process

and the behavior of people by the interests classes and

class struggle only in a class society, and socialism was considered a classless society (such was declared by Stalin himself in 1936), and therefore no

socio-political

phenomena in it could not be substantiated by references to the class struggle. But then how

same

explain that the USSR is teeming with pests, saboteurs, murderers, about 10 million

who annually sits in concentration camps? In the already mentioned article dated January 13, Stalin gave a disarmingly simple answer: "In the

USSR, the exploiting classes have long been defeated and liquidated, but they still survive ... the bearers of bourgeois views and bourgeois morality are

living people (emphasis added in the original. - A. A.) hidden enemies of our people. Here they are,

these

"living people", having united in a class in a classless society, are waging a mortal struggle with Stalin.

These theses of Stalin underlie the ideological campaign of Pravda throughout January and February. On January 18, Pravda, additionally citing statements made by Stalin back in Yezhov's time about classes and "enemies of the people", calls in the Russian regions of the country to expose these "enemies of the people", and in the national republics - "bourgeois nationalists".

At the height of the campaign, on January 21, the Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR is published: "For assistance provided to the government in exposing pest doctors, to award the doctor Timashuk Lidia Fedoseevna with the Order of Lenin. This is already an open call to local sexots

timashukam: let's write more denunciations - and you will also receive an order!

January 22 Pravda publishes a report by Secretary of the Central Committee Mikhailov on the twenty-ninth anniversary of Lenin's death. Stalin knew to whom to entrust the report: Mikhailov not only almost literally repeated his article of January 13, but also added several sharp statements of Stalin during the Yezhovshchina.

On January 24, Pravda, in connection with the elections to local Soviets, persistently calls on the people to be vigilant and united around the Lenin-Stalin Party.

On January 25, Pravda emphatically marks the anniversary of the poisoning of Kuibyshev by "doctors pests."

31 January Pravda publishes an editorial entitled "Educate the Working People in the Spirit of High Political Vigilance." The article, referring to the "trials over recent years of gangs of spies and wreckers in Bulgaria, Hungary,

Czechoslovakia, Poland

And

other people's democratic countries, exposing in the USSR a gang of dastardly spies and murderers", calls on the country to resolutely expose the "hidden enemies of our people". The newspaper cites examples of exposing "foreign elements" in the leading bodies of ministries in Ukraine and "cosmopolitans", Lithuanian and Jewish "bourgeois nationalists" in Lithuania.

February 6 Pravda publishes a long article about arrests by state security agencies  
spies in

different regions of the USSR. The article is replete with examples of the theft of secret documents (Poskrebyshchev!), which for some reason will certainly fall into the hands of "enemies" and "traitors".

11] February Timashuk, in a letter to the editors of Pravda, thanks for "numerous letters and telegrams" with congratulations on her exposure of the "enemies of the Soviet people".

On the basis of the denunciation of this "patriot of their Motherland", Stalin created the "case of doctors." But Timashuk denounced only one doctor - Academician Vinogradov. As we have already mentioned, this

Beria's denunciation could have been organized in order to deprive Stalin of conscientious and  
loyal  
personal doctor. In plans for the future illness of Stalin, Academician Vinogradov was superfluous,

a really harmful person for Beria precisely because of his conscientiousness and loyalty. Beria was going to assign his own doctor to Stalin, but this failed - Stalin did not allow any doctors to see him and switched to medical "self-service" from his small home first-aid kit. Beria, of course, was not planning this, but nevertheless he was satisfied with the fact that Stalin was out of medical control.

In the midst of Pravda's frantic campaign against the "murderers," two more murders occur, then passed off as natural death. But now it is already clear that Stalin needed one death, and Beria needed the other.

On February 17, the Izvestia newspaper reported that General Kosynkin, the head of the commandant

ry of the Kremlin, responsible for Stalin's security. The general was appointed to this post directly from Stalin's bodyguard. A relatively young man, quite healthy, fanatically devoted to Stalin and feeling independent of Beria, he underestimated Beria's capabilities, and therefore died "untimely". But the murder that Stalin needed was organized quite naturally, even solemnly, so that everyone would think - "a man died at a military post." We are talking about Leo Mehlis.

In the historical formation of Stalin the tyrant, in terms of ideology, Mekhlis was the same as Yezhov

and Beria on the part of the police. Mehlis was the only member of the Central Committee who could say: "I

paved Stalin's ideological path to power through all the corpses of Lenin's old guard, but I made him both the great leader of the party and the ingenious luminary of all sciences. Enough to take

Pravda sets from the 20s and 30s to see how its editor Mekhlis succeeded in achieving this goal. Grateful Stalin reciprocated:

Mekhlis, a former student of the Institute of Red Professors, was first made deputy editor-in-chief, then editor-in-chief of Pravda, and after the "great purge" Stalin introduced him to the Central Committee and its Orgburo (a collegium that distributed the highest cadres of the party and state) . During the war, Stalin appointed him his deputy for the People's Commissariat

of Defense and head of the Main Political Directorate of the Red Army with the rank of colonel general (Khrushchev, a member

of the Politburo, was only a lieutenant general). After the war, Stalin made him Minister of State Control and again a member of the Central Committee (at the 20th Congress). After the "Zionist case"

And

new "case of pest doctors" Stalin remembered the well-known "defect" of Mekhlis - he was a Jew. The flat logic of the anti-Semite prompted him: if a Jew, then a Zionist, and if a Zionist, then he could give the task to Zionist doctors (not only a patient, but also the patron of whom he was) to kill his longtime rival and successor as head of the Chief

political

management of the Red Army, a former classmate in the ICP - A. Shcherbakov. And while the "doctors pests" were awaiting trial, Stalin sent Mekhlis on an "important business trip" to Saratov. There, without noise and without witnesses, he was arrested. Transferred to the hospital of the Lefortovo Prison in Moscow, he gave Stalin the testimony he needed and died on February 13, 1953 (see: Ulsyug Aekhapagou. Tbe Kreti, p. 325).

Mekhlis was solemnly buried on Red Square in the presence of many members of the Politburo, marshals,

ministers, but without Stalin. Probably, Stalin decided that hypocrisy should also have a measure. At least he was not absent due to illness, since on February 17 he received the Indian Ambassador K. Menon and had a long talk with him. According to K. Menon, Stalin, despite his seventy-three years, looked like a perfectly healthy person. During the conversation, Stalin drew on the sheets

wolf's notepad and expressed an idea that not only did not belong to a diplomatic conversation, but was not even diplomatic. As if commenting on his own drawings, he remarked

What

peasants act wisely, destroying rabid wolves! Stalin, of course, was thinking about "rabid wolves" from the Politburo

(see: K. Mepop. Tve Nushe TgoKa. Gopdogp. 1963, p. 29).

Meanwhile, Pravda continues its campaign to inflame the political and psychological atmosphere in the country. Articles and Correspondence of Pravda 8, 9, 11, 12, 16, 18,

February 19, 20, 22, 23, 26, 27 are dedicated to "murderers", "spies", "saboteurs", "enemies of the people" and "bourgeois nationalists". Not a single political editorial of Pravda comes out without a reference to "vigilance" and "enemies of the people." According to the exact recipes of the Yezhovshchina period, Pravda purposefully and systematically cultivates a general spy mania.

Late in the evening of February 28, Pravda for March 1 comes out, in which a resolution is printed

The Central Committee of the CPSU about the women's holiday - the day of March 8 - but it also talks about "spies", "murderers", "hidden enemies of the Soviet people" ...

And from the next day, something strange and inexplicable happens: Pravda suddenly stops publishing all kinds of

materials about "enemies of the people." Moreover, the "enemies of the people" are completely

Not

are even mentioned in political articles and commentaries. In the editorials of Pravda of March 2 ("The Rise of the Socialist Nations") and of March 3 ("The Most Important Condition for the Rise of Propaganda") there is not a word about "bourgeois nationalists", "enemies of the people", "spies"

And

"killers"!

The campaign against the "enemies of the people" was cancelled. Canceled, of course, not in the editorial

"Pravda",  
but at the top. Who canceled it? Stalin? No, of course not Stalin. It was canceled by those who, starting from | | March 1953 guarded the death of Stalin. These "guards" in the person of the four - Beria, Malenkov, Khrushchev and Bulganin - carried out a coup on the night of February 28 to March 1, 1953, veiled by referring to the illness of Stalin, who had "temporarily" stepped down from power. The four immediately distributed

power among themselves, bypassing the Presidium of the Central Committee of the CPSU. All the other heirs of Stalin from the Politburo - old, legitimate, but not involved in the coup - got secondary roles. The Quartet issued a "Government

Communication", which ended like this: "The Central Committee and the Council of Ministers of the USSR, like our entire party, our entire Soviet people, are aware of the full significance of the fact that the serious illness of Comrade Stalin will entail a more or less prolonged non-participation him in leadership. Central Committee and

The Council of Ministers, in leading the party and the country, takes into account with all seriousness all the circumstances connected with the temporary departure of Comrade Stalin from leading state and party activities" ("Pravda", 4.03.53).

Stalin, meanwhile, was dying, dying slowly but surely, according to all the rules of the "sabotage treatment" that he called on himself ... By the way, another lie appeared in the first "Government Communication". It said that Stalin's stroke - a brain hemorrhage -

occurred on the night of March 2, when he was in Moscow in his apartment, but in fact, as it turned out later, this happened not in Moscow, but in Kuntsevo. If everything happens naturally

and the conscience of Stalin's disciples is clear, then why do they hide the real place of his death? Why is it necessary, on behalf of the Central Committee and the Council of Ministers, to crudely deceive one's own party and people, if not in order to create an alibi for oneself?

The first to learn from Khrushchev that Stalin did not die in Moscow was the former governor of New York, the US ambassador to Moscow during the war, Averell Harriman. Khrushchev told him How the four guarded the death of Stalin. Here is what Harriman says about it:

The so-called Doctors' Plot, in which several doctors were accused of conspiring to kill certain leading Communists, was apparently concocted by Stalin to start a new purge. Some foreign observers of Russia hinted that people from Stalin's entourage, fearing to lose their own lives in connection with the new mass terror, killed the old man themselves. I've been looking for an answer to this all the time. In my recent lengthy conversation with Khrushchev, Khrushchev told his version of Stalin's death. Later, at my request, he gave me permission to publish it.

Stalin, Khrushchev told me, had become very suspicious, despotic in recent years.

and ruthless. "He

He didn't trust anyone, and none of us believed him either. He did not let us do the work that he himself had not been able to do for a long time. It was very difficult for us. One Saturday night he invited

us for lunch at his dacha outside the city. Stalin howled in a good mood. It was a fun evening and we had a good time.

Then we drove home. On Sundays he used to call us to discuss business, but on that Sunday he didn't call, which surprised us. On Monday, he also did not return to the city. On Monday evening, the head of his bodyguard calls and says

that Stalin is ill. All of us - Beria, Malenkov, Bulganin and I - immediately went to the dacha to see him. He has already passed out.

One arm and one leg were paralyzed, the tongue was taken away. We were with him for three days, but consciousness

did not return to him. Then for some time consciousness returned to him, and then we entered his room. The nurse gave him tea

from a spoon. He shook hands with us and tried to joke with us, trying to laugh, pointed with his good hand at the picture hanging

over his bed. It had a picture of a goat being fed by a little girl with a spoon. Now, as if he were saying with a gesture, he is as

helpless as this goat. After a while he died. I cried. Before

all we

were his disciples and owe him everything."

I asked Khrushchev if Stalin chose his heir. Khrushchev sharply replied: "He didn't

chose. He thought he would live forever."

From this story we learn important things:

1) Stalin did not die in Moscow, but at his dacha (later we learn from Alliluyeva that it was the Kuntsevo dacha);

2) Stalin's last visitors were Beria, Malenkov, Khrushchev and Bulganin, and they spent the whole night of Saturday, February 28, 1953, drinking at Stalin's;

3) only on Monday, March 2, did Stalin's bodyguards inform the four that Stalin had fallen ill, they went to him and waited at his bedside for three days, calmly awaiting his death;

4) doctors are not mentioned at all.

Khrushchev later repeated this version many times to different people. In the memoirs of Khrushchev

she

slightly expanded. The date of Stalin's illness has been moved to February 28, but the essence remains the same.

Only, obviously, someone advised Khrushchev that it was necessary to mention the doctors, at least on the second day of his illness. The final version of the story looks like this:

"Stalin fell ill in February 1953 (that is, February 28. - A. A.). Malenkov, Beria, Bulganin and I were at his dacha Near on Saturday night ... As usual, dinner lasted until 5 - 6 o'clock

morning. Stalin was fairly drunk after dinner and in a very high spirits. There were no signs of any physical illness... We went home happy

that dinner ended so well... I was sure that the next day, Sunday, Stalin would call us for a meeting, but there was no call from him . Suddenly there was a phone call. It was Malenkov, he said: "Listen, the guards just called from Stalin's dacha. They think something happened to Stalin. It will be better if we go there. I have already informed Beria and Bulganin. It will be good if you leave immediately"...

I dressed quickly and went to Stalin's dacha... In 15 minutes I was there. When we were all assembled, we visited the officers on duty before

going to Stalin's room. The officers explained to us why they raised the alarm: "Comrade Stalin usually almost always calls someone and asks for

tea or something to eat by 11 o'clock. He didn't do it today." That's why

they sent

Matryona Petrovna to find out what's the matter. She was an old maid who had worked for Stalin for a long time. She was not distinguished by

brilliant abilities, but she was honest and devoted to Stalin. When she returned, she informed the guards that Stalin was lying on the floor of a

large room in which he usually sleeps. Obviously, Stalin fell out of bed. The guards picked him up from the floor and

put on

sofa in a small room. When we were told all this, we decided that it was inconvenient come to

Stalin, when he is in such an unrepresentable state. We went home" (KBgizvsVeu. Ketetfets, y01.1, pp. 340-342).

Means:

1) On February 28, four feasted with Stalin;

2) they left Stalin on the morning of March 1;

3) in the evening of the same day, Stalin fell seriously ill (fell out of bed and could not get up on his own, did not demand food, did not talk to the servants: apparently, he lost his speech);

4) the four were called on the evening of March 1 to the sick Stalin, but they did not call

doctors, refused to see the patient and went home.



Khrushchev continues:

"Late at night, Malenkov called a second time: "Stalin's guards called. They say, what with  
Something is definitely wrong with Stalin."

When we again sent Matrena Petrovna to check on Stalin's condition, she said that he was sleeping deeply, but not an ordinary sleep. We decided it was best to leave. We instructed Malenkov to call Kaganovich and Voroshilov, who were not with us the day before, as well as the doctors" (ibid., p. 342).

Finally, the doctors were called! The doctors stripped Stalin and carried him back to a large room with more light. Doctors  
"told us that this kind of illness didn't last long and could be fatal," Khrushchev says.

Who are these doctors? They are not known to anyone. As we will see later, none of them knows and

Svetlana Alliluyeva. Not only is there no personal doctor Stalin Vinogradov, but also those who  
V

under normal conditions, he should have immediately arrived at the sick Stalin: the head of the Medical and Sanitary Directorate, Egorov, was imprisoned along with Vinogradov, and the Minister of Health of the USSR Smirnov, Stalin's drinking companion, disappeared just on the eve of Stalin's illness, replaced by Tretyakov, whom no one knows either.

Khrushchev's words "we did everything to  
put

Stalin on his feet "after his own story, how, after inquiring from Matryona Petrovna about  
able

Stalin, they did not even go to him, did not call the doctors, but went home. Doctors were called (if they were doctors at all) only  
when Stalin was in a hopeless state, and only then was he undressed!

Khrushchev goes on to say that the only person who wanted Stalin dead was Beria. Beria openly mocked the dying Stalin (see ibid., p. 343).

However, Khrushchev's other confession is important:

"I was more frank with Bulganin than with others ... I asked him:

- Do you know what the situation will be if Stalin dies? Do you know what post you want to take?

Beria?

- Which?

He wants to become the Minister of State Security. If he becomes one, then this is the beginning of the end for all of us ...  
Whatever  
happens, we absolutely must not allow it.

Bulganin said that he agreed with me, and we began to discuss that from now on we

Must do. I  
said that I would talk about all this with Malenkov. I think he  
agree with  
us" (ibid., p. 344).

If Khrushchev is sometimes sincere, then in this case he is doubly sincere: the struggle  
behind

the division of Stalin's political legacy began at the bedside of the dying man, and Beria was designated as the first victim. But he still got the post of  
Minister of State Security:  
He  
simply took it, taking at the same time the post of Minister of the Interior.

Let us return to the dates of the onset of Stalin's illness mentioned above.

So, when, in fact, Stalin had a stroke - on Saturday, February 28, when his  
visited  
four; on Sunday, March 1, when she had already left him (both of these dates of the onset of the disease were named by Khrushchev); on the night  
of March 2,  
according to the "Government Communication" (it lied about the location of Stalin, it could have lied about the date), or on the evening of the same  
March  
2, as Khrushchev told Harriman?

Four dates have been named, so it is difficult to say with certainty which one is the true one. I am leaning towards the date of February 28, because,  
as mentioned above, already on March 1, power was in fact in the hands of the four (objective proof of this is the sudden cessation of the  
campaign in Pravda  
against the "enemies of the people" on March 1-2). But it is very important for the conspirators to hide (not  
only  
from the people, but especially from the party and the army) what happens to Stalin in order to win

time for the smooth and successful completion of the coup. Since the conspirators are interested in creating an impeccable alibi,  
they invite Stalin's  
children and two elected members of the Politburo (Voroshilov and Kaganovich) to the bedside of the dying man on the second

or  
the third day of illness, and the people are informed about it on the fourth or fifth day, when the death of Stalin is already inevitable.

Now let's turn to the memoirs of Svetlana Alliluyeva. She confirms that Stalin died not in Moscow, but at the Kuntsevo dacha; she and Vasily Stalin  
were  
summoned to the dying man only on March 2, when Stalin finally lost consciousness. She writes further: "Strange doctors, seeing the patient for the  
first time,  
fussed terribly around. They put leeches on the neck and back of the head, removed

cardiograms, X-rays of the lungs were taken, the nurse was constantly giving some kind of injections, one of  
the  
doctors was constantly writing down the course of the disease in the journal ... Everyone was fussing, saving  
the life that

it was no longer possible to save ... "(“ Twenty Letters to a Friend ”, pp. 6-7). Of all these doctors, S. Alliluyeva

a female doctor seemed familiar. “I suddenly realized that I know this young woman doctor, where did I see her? We nodded to each other, but did not speak” (ibid., p. 7). (This female doctor is important to remember.)

Alliluyeva's observations about Stalin's behavior when he came to his senses are not at all the same as those of Khrushchev.

Khrushchev says that when consciousness returned to Stalin for a while, “then

then he began to shake hands with each of us...” (KBgazvsVeu. Ketetegs, vo1. 1, p. 343).

Alliluyeva says: “The agony was terrible. She was strangling him in front of everyone... At some point... he suddenly opened his

eyes and looked around at everyone who was standing around. It was a terrible look, either insane or angry ... This look went

around everyone in a fraction of a minute. And then—it was incomprehensible and frightening, I still don't understand,

but I can't forget—here he suddenly raised his left hand (which was moving) upwards and somehow pointed upwards with it

(Khrushchev repeats twice that Stalin He pointed to a drawing with a goat and a girl - A. A.), otherwise he

threatened us all. The gesture was incomprehensible, but threatening, and it is not known to whom and to what it referred” (“Twenty

Letters to a Friend”, pp. 9-10). So that almost idyllic farewell of Stalin with his comrades-in-arms, which Khrushchev draws, was not. The farewell was “angry”, “threatening”.

But Khrushchev's and Alliluyeva's observations on Beria's behavior largely coincide.

Alliluyeva writes; “Only one person behaved almost indecently - it was Beria. He was excited to the extreme ... his

face continually distorted from the passions bursting him. And his passions were - ambition, cruelty, cunning, power,

power ... He tried so hard at this crucial moment, no matter how to outwit and how not to underwire ... He approached

to bed

and for a long time peered into the face of the patient - the father sometimes opened his eyes ... But it was without

consciousness ... Beria looked then, glaring into those misty eyes ... And when it was all over, he was the first to jump out into the

corridor, and in silence hall, where everyone stood silently around the bed, his loud voice was heard, not hiding the triumph:

“Khrustalev! car! He was a magnificent modern type of crafty courtier, the embodiment of oriental treachery,

flattery, hypocrisy, which entangled even his father, whom it was generally difficult to deceive ... In many ways,

Lavrenty managed to trick his father ... dies

father,

no one in Russia was in the hands of greater power than this terrible man" (ibid., pp. 7-8).

Therefore, after Stalin, power was in fact in the hands of Beria, but since Stalin was now unconscious, the power over Stalin -

to live or die to him - was also in his hands. Both Khrushchev and Alliluyeva are unanimous in their observations: Beria wished Stalin's

death, and when it came, he triumphed. Now we come to the most puzzling question: weren't the sick Stalin treated

according to the method that Stalin attributed to the arrested doctors of the Kremlin - making the wrong diagnosis and giving counter-indicative drugs? We have

one exceptionally important witness who was present at the death of Stalin and categorically and publicly stated: Stalin was

poisoned, Stalin was killed! This is the son of Stalin - Lieutenant General Vasily Stalin.

As can be seen from her books, Stalin's daughter quite early began to show a critical attitude towards

her father's teachings and the Soviet reality surrounding her, but she does not write that she was seriously interested in political

issues or that she had any conversations with her father on political topics. As if remaining true to the patriarchal traditions of the Caucasus, where

almost

it was indecent to talk to a woman about politics, Stalin, apparently, did not talk about politics with his daughter.

In addition,

the daughter visited her father in the last two or three years of his life very rarely. It was completely different with my son.

Vasily Stalin graduated from the military aviation school by the beginning of the war. He spent the entire war on the fronts, flew fighter jets, commanded a division, a corps, an air formation in Germany after the war. Then he was appointed

commander of the air forces of the Moscow Military District. All traditional air parades near Moscow, and during the holidays and over Red Square, were personally commanded by Vasily Stalin. Of course, at the age of twenty-five to twenty-six, officers are not made generals, except for Napoleon (on

then he

and was Napoleon), but Vasily must also be considered a kind of exception - he was son

Stalin. Stalin's marshals, in order to please the Supreme Commander himself, groveled before his

son and showered him with ranks and orders. However, no matter how much they said that Vasily liked to drink, no one

disputed him from

vag and courage during the war, and cowards do not climb into the pilots of jet fighter aircraft.

If Stalin ever revealed to anyone at least a particle of that innermost that  
He

thought about his associates from the Politburo, then most likely only his selflessly devoted son. Relations between father and son remained  
normal even after

Vasily was removed from  
his

positions: this can be seen at least from the fact that, on the advice of his father, he entered the Academy of the General Staff. Vasily Stalin,  
like his sister, was

informed about the blow that happened to his father, as already indicated, only on the second or third day, when Stalin no longer spoke. IN

such

the state of the dying no longer complain.

But great are the mysteries of Providence. Some unknown force, perhaps just an inner feeling of her daughter, forced Alliluyeva to call the dying  
Stalin on

that Sunday, | March 1953. "I wanted to come (to my father - A.A.) again on Sunday, March 1, but I didn't

could

get through" ("Twenty Letters to a Friend", p. 195).

Of course I couldn't get through! All Stalin's phones were in the hands of Beria, they were blocked, but this testimony of Alliluyeva is of  
historical significance.

Alliluyeva continues: "And on the morning of March 2, I was called from classes at the Academy and told to go to Kuntsevo. My brother Vasily was  
also

summoned on March 2, 1953. He, too, sat for several hours in this large hall... In the service house he was still drinking, making noise,  
slandering

doctors, shouting that "they have killed their father", "they are killing"..." (ibid., pp. 195-196).

Alliluyeva is probably inclined to think that her brother is raging under the influence of alcohol. However, on the days of the funeral, obviously completely  
sober,

carrying his father's coffin next to Molotov, he again repeats that "they killed his father." Alliluyeva continues: "The death of his father shocked him.

He was horrified. He was sure that his father had been "poisoned", "killed"; he saw that the world was collapsing, without which he could not  
exist ...

On the days of the funeral, he was in a terrible state and behaved

respectively

- rushed at everyone with reproaches, blamed the government, doctors, everyone he could,

- what's wrong

treated... He felt like a crown prince" (ibid., p. 198).

Vasily's confidence that his father was killed, which he persistently and repeatedly repeated to everyone who wanted to hear it (Vasily probably  
hoped that

the army would intercede for his Supreme), was not and could not be the delirium of a drunk. He knew too much. He knew that the conspirators  
"organized the illness" of Stalin, he also knew that his father was thinking about the impending conspiracy. young general,

knowing the secret of his father's death, could become a banner, even the organizer of a new coup

against the usurpers of paternal power. Therefore, his days in the wild were numbered.

At first they tried to get rid of him in an amicable way. Defense Minister Bulganin summoned him to

himself and invited him to go to the provinces, to one of the military districts, but he refused, wanting to stay in Moscow. Then he was demoted, arrested and put in the now famous their

brutal regime Vladimir prison. This happened less than two months after Stalin's death - on April 28, 1953. After spending seven years there, he died in exile in Kazan in March 1962. His sister thinks that he died of alcoholism, but, alas, there is another, more ruthless disease in the world - politics. He probably died from it...

Let's go back to official documents.

In the "Government Communication" on behalf of the Central Committee of the CPSU and the Council of Ministers, published only on March 4, 1953, it is said: "On the night of March 2 at Comrade Stalin's, when He

was in Moscow in his apartment, there was a cerebral hemorrhage that captured important

for the life of the brain area. Comrade Stalin lost consciousness. Paralysis of the right arm and leg developed. There was a loss of speech.

The serious, fatal illness of Stalin is reported only on the fourth day, because in fact Stalin had a stroke on the evening of March 1 (see Khrushchev's

story above). The "government report" about Stalin's illness, apparently, was compiled by the conspirators without consulting doctors, otherwise

Stalin would not have lost consciousness first, and then speech. For the treatment of Stalin, a commission of eight doctors - academicians and professors -

is being created. The commission is headed by the new Minister of Health of the USSR Tretyakov and the new head of the Kremlin Medical and Sanitary

Department Kuperin. The report says that "the treatment of Comrade Stalin is carried out under

permanent

supervision of the Central Committee of the CPSU and the Soviet Government", that is, "sabotage treatment" is excluded.

On March 5 and 6, several bulletins are published on the course of Stalin's illness. Compiled this time, apparently using the latest and best medical

textbooks, the bulletins are striking in their detail and abundance of incomprehensible, purely medical terms, partially immediately translated into Russian.

Behind external concern about the course of Stalin's illness and "energetic measures

mi" of his treatment, sometimes even causing a partial improvement in the patient's condition, it is felt that Stalin's death is a decided matter.

Thus, a bulletin compiled on March 5, the day of death, and published on March 6, reports: "At 11 hours 30 minutes, a severe collapse occurred for the second time, which was

events"; but even:

"In the future, cardiovascular disorders somewhat decreased, although the general condition continued to remain extremely difficult," in a word, the matter is tending to a fatal outcome, but energetic medical measures still do not allow Stalin to die.

March 5, 1953 Stalin dies. Then the heirs resort to an unheard-of measure:

They

create a completely new commission of seven academicians and professors headed by

with

the same Tretyakov and Kuperin to confirm the correctness of the diagnosis of Stalin's illness and the correctness of his

treatment under the guidance of the Central Committee. The commission gave an authoritative conclusion:

"The results of the pathoanatomical study fully confirm the diagnosis made by the professors-doctors who treated I.V. Stalin. The data of the pathoanatomical study established the irreversible nature of I.V.

Stalin's disease from the moment of the onset of cerebral hemorrhage. Therefore, the vigorous treatment measures taken are

not

could give a positive result and prevent a fatal outcome "(Izvestia, 03/07/53). These are not doctors, but Beria and his

accomplices enlisted evidence to prove their alibi. They knew that not only Vasily Stalin would claim that "they killed Stalin." But the

mere fact that they needed such evidence gives them away.

Palace coup on the night of February 28 to March 1, 1953 against Stalin during

many

recalls the palace coup against Paul [and his assassination on the night of March 11-12, 1801. Then the noble elite rebelled

against the cruel tsar, now the Stalinist elite has rebelled

against the "father and teacher", who openly threatened "infanticide". In this last

there is a difference: the conspirators of the nobility rose up to save Russia from the tyrant, while the Stalinists rose up to save their own heads.

Most of the conspirators against Paul were inclined to save the life of the king if he signed a manifesto on voluntary renunciation of the throne (only on this condition did he give

his

consent to the coup, Paul's son Alexander); most of the conspirators against Stalin, ver

Obviously, they would also save his life if he voluntarily resigned from his posts. But Beria thought that under the circumstances, the best Stalin was dead Stalin. In his defense, he could

I would like to quote my predecessor, the organizer of the conspiracy against Pavel, the St. Petersburg military governor, Count Palen, who said on the night of the conspiracy to his accomplices: "Remember, gentlemen, that you cannot make scrambled eggs without breaking eggs."

Even the announcements of a new era after Paul and after Stalin echo between

yourself. The usual traditional formula for the natural succession to the throne in old Russia was that the son would rule in the spirit of "our unforgettable parent", but in the manifesto of March 12, 1801, Alexander [emphasized that he would rule according to the laws and "according to

heart" of the late Empress Catherine P. This meant liberal government. The conspirators against Stalin, in their first resolution after his death, dissociate themselves

from him by keeping silent about his name and promising to govern the country, guided by "the policy developed by our party", and not by the "brilliant instructions" of the recently deceased "father, teacher and leader." At the same time, the heirs warn against

possible

"confusion and panic" (nothing, they say, terrible happened!). Here is the relevant place from

Resolutions of the joint meeting of the plenum of the Central Committee of the CPSU, the Council of Ministers of the USSR, the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR of March 7, 1953:

"The Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, the Council of Ministers of the USSR, the

Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, at this difficult time for our party and country, consider it the most important task of the party and government to ensure uninterrupted and correct leadership ... which in turn requires ... preventing any confusion and panic, so as to unconditionally ensure the successful implementation of the policy worked out by our party and government both in the internal affairs of our country and in international affairs.

Thus, in this first, most important legal act of succession, there is no

neither

words about Stalin, but there are promises to rule the way our "empress" - the party - once ruled.

If the analogy, then to the end: Count Palen thought that he would rule Russia under the young tsar, but Alexander G dismissed him. Overthrowing Stalin, Beria thought to turn Stalin's Russia into take Russia

Evskaya, hiding behind the name of the nominal tsar Malenkov, but he was outwitted and sent to the next world, guided by his own "philosophy": the best enemy is a dead enemy.

HOW DID THE REVOLUTION HAPPEN?

If the existence of an anti-Stalinist conspiracy is to be regarded as an undeniable fact (both in terms of the conditions of the oligarchy at the top and the objective results of the coup), then the question of how the coup itself took place remains one of the deepest secrets of the Kremlin. After the 20th Congress, after the "Closed Letter of the Central Committee" to the party, after a number of articles in the press in

early

In 1956, with the revelations of Stalin, Soviet and foreign communists began to bombard the Central Committee of the CPSU with letters and requests: "If Stalin was such a scoundrel, then what

same

did you, because he was nothing without you? The Central Committee decided it was time to say something important.



A resolution of the Central Committee of the CPSU of June 30, 1956 "On overcoming the cult of personality and its consequences." In it, the Central Committee admitted for the first and last time that the anti-Stalinist leaders of the Central Committee (the four) did not sit idly by. In their person, a counterbalance to Stalin was created: "The 20th Party Congress and the entire policy of the Central Committee after Stalin's death clearly indicate that within the Central Committee of the Party there was an established Leninist core of leaders" ("Pravda", 2.07.56).

Since Stalin himself was not included in this "established Leninist core of leaders", it is absolutely clear that it formed against him. Thus, this "Leninist core" is the pseudonym of the anti-Stalinist conspiracy. The conspiracy is actually recognized, but the technique of its implementation is silent (only ten years after the death of Stalin, Khrushchev

a little lifted the veil over this mystery). However, first we will analyze the versions that appeared in the Western press.

The first version belongs to Ilya Ehrenburg, a figurehead, the mouthpiece of the then Kremlin leadership. In entrusting this mission to Ehrenburg, the Kremlin pursued the same goals, as in

Decree of the Central Committee of June 30, 1956 on the cult of personality: to make it clear that when Stalin created the case of "wreckers", the leaders of

the Central Committee did not sit idly by. Ehrenburg told his version to the French philosopher and writer Jean Paul Sartre. after pub

lications in the French press, it went around the entire world press.

Briefly, Ehrenburg's story boils down to the following: On March 1, 1953, a meeting of the Presidium of the Central Committee of the CPSU took place. At

this meeting, L. Kaganovich spoke, demanding from Stalin: 1) the creation of a special commission for an objective investigation of the "doctors' case"; 2) the cancellation of the order given by Stalin on the deportation of all Jews to a remote zone of the USSR (a new Pale of Settlement).

Kaganovich

was supported by all members of the old Politburo, except for Beria (?!). This

an unusual and unprecedented unanimity showed Stalin that he was dealing with a pre-organized conspiracy. Having lost his self-control, Stalin not only burst into public abuse, but also began to threaten the rebels with the most cruel reprisals. However, the conspirators foresaw such a

reaction to Kaganovich's ultimatum issued on behalf of the Politburo. They also knew that they would not leave the Kremlin free, if it was Stalin's will. Therefore, they also took appropriate preventive measures, as Mikoyan told the raging Stalin: "If in half an hour we do not leave this room free, the

army will occupy the Kremlin!" After this statement, Beria also moved away from Stalin. Beria's betrayal finally brought Stalin out of balance. And Kaganovich, in

addition, right there in front of Stalin's eyes, tore his membership card of the Presidium of the Central Committee of the CPSU into small pieces and threw it in Stalin's face. Before Stalin had time to call the Kremlin guards, he was struck by a blow: he fell without

consciousness.

Doctors were allowed to see Stalin only at six o'clock in the morning on March 2 (see: Gellé, 1.09.56).

With Ehrenburg's "shot" the post-Stalin Central Committee wanted to kill three birds with one stone; firstly, we did not stand idle when Stalin wanted to create a new Pale of Settlement for Soviet Jews; secondly, Stalin did not die without our help; thirdly, Beria, as always, was with Stalin, but went over to our side when he saw that the army was with us. Note that, as in Khrushchev's future stories, in Orenburg's version, doctors are called to see Stalin only on the second day of his fatal blow.

A year later, in 1957, the Kremlin inspired Ponomarenko, former member of the Presidium of the Central Committee of the CPSU and Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU, and then Ambassador of the USSR to the Netherlands, to speak abroad. And although Ponomarenko, in essence, only confirmed Ehrenburg's story, his version, since he was an official and a member of the Central Committee, was picked up by the world press as the greatest sensation.

Here is that version. Stalin at the end of February 1953 convened a meeting of the Presidium of the Central Committee and reported on the testimony of "pestologists" - how they killed prominent party leaders and how They were going to keep doing this. At the same time, Stalin submitted for approval to the Presidium of the Central Committee a draft decree on the deportation of all Jews to Central Asia. Then Molotov spoke

And Kaganovich with statements that such a deportation would produce a catastrophic impression on external world. Stalin went into a rage, began to smash everyone who dared to disagree with his

project. Once again Kaganovich spoke, this time sharply and irreconcilably, defiantly tore up his party card (membership card of the Presidium of the Central Committee? - A. A.) and threw it on the table in front of Stalin. Kaganovich ended his speech with the words: "Stalin is a disgrace to our country!" Everyone supported Kaganovich and Molotov, and the indignant Stalin suddenly fell unconscious - he collapsed. Beria was delighted and began to shout: "The tyrant is dead, we are free!" - but when Stalin suddenly opened his eyes, Beria allegedly knelt down and began to ask Stalin for an apology.

(This banal scene with Beria is present in many Soviet inspirations.)

The author from whom we took Ponomarenko's version asks: "Was Stalin allowed to die a natural death, or, as the rumors persist, was a conspiracy organized against him by his heirs?"

According to Ehrenburg, Stalin himself was deeply convinced that members of the Politburo organized a plot to kill him. Only it is very strange and in the light of subsequent events it is simply inexplicable that Stalin confused the imaginary conspirators with the real ones. The story attributed to Ehrenburg says: "After the KhPKh congress, it became clear that Stalin had

mania

persecution... He was preparing the greatest bloody purge, he wanted to physically destroy the Central Committee of the Twentieth Congress. In conversations he expressed the idea that Voroshilov, Molotov, Kaganovich, Mikoyan wanted to kill him" (ibid.).

These statements or suspicions of Stalin are in full agreement with his daily behavior and with his attitude towards his associates. As we have seen, Stalin openly accused them all of treason.

After the 22nd Congress of the CPSU, the question of Stalin's death again arose: was it really a tyrant who had committed so many crimes (not only Khrushchev spoke about them at the congress, but all the new members of the

Presidium of the Central Committee), died a natural death? Once

vestments of Stalin's monstrous crimes (from mass executions according to "lists", without trial of old Bolsheviks and even the wives of many of them, to new details of the murder of Kirov) so obviously hurt the party that indignation grew in it: why was such a scoundrel not killed?

In 1963, Khrushchev, openly saying that people were indignant that Stalin had not died for ten years

earlier, declared: "They are right."

Just ten years after Stalin's death, after two years of intense anti-Stalinist propaganda since the 20th Congress, Khrushchev for the first time ventured to shed light on some of the details of Stalin's death. He did this in front of the leaders of the Polish Communist Party. Either the circle of listeners was too wide, or this was part of Khrushchev's plans, but some of the new details he told made their way to the pages of the French magazine *Pars MacB* and were reprinted with comments in the German magazine *Per Sprece* 1 (1963, Mo 32). Your analysis of "Spiegel"

begins with the statement: "A whole series of evidence speaks to the fact that Stalin did not die of natural causes in any case, as official reports at one time wanted to assure us."

This version of Khrushchev depicts events as follows: Stalin did not die at all in the Kremlin apartment, but in the former estate of Count Orlov (this is the Kuntsevo dacha). Here, completely isolated from the outside world, Stalin was "a prisoner of his own fear." On the night of March 2, Khrushchev, Malenkov, Beria and Molotov were urgently called here by Stalin's guards (we already know What

Molotov was not among them, but Bulganin was. - 4. A.). The guards reported that Stalin had not shown signs of life for many hours.

Security could not find out what was the matter, because of the complexity

internal communication system between three separate rooms, one of which was Stalin. Only he himself could open the doors with the help of a special electric

mechanism. Since none of the guards knew exactly which room Stalin was in, they had to break open all the doors in a row: they opened one, opened another - and here they found Stalin. He lay lifeless on the floor, dressed in the uniform of a generalissimo. Responded first

Beria. "The tyrant is dead, dead, dead," he shouted triumphantly. At this moment, Stalin opened his eyes wide. No, he's alive.

Malenkov, Khrushchev, Molotov left the room. Beria,

constantly

who carried ampoules of poison with him, was left alone with his vengeful master. Only five hours later (allegedly due to

heavy icy conditions on the roads) doctors were called.

This is the version of Khrushchev, the Poles, the French magazine. It is important to note that some

earlier (March 8, 1963), Khrushchev, at a reception of representatives of the Soviet intelligentsia, hinted quite unambiguously that Beria not only did not hide his triumph for

about Stalin's death, but was also interested in his premature death (Der Spiegel, 1963, No. 32). If only Beria is interested in

Stalin's death, then why

his

left alone, and even with poison, with a helpless, seriously ill Stalin?

In these two chapters, we analyzed five versions of Stalin's last days: 1) Ehrenburg - 1956, 2) Ponomarenko - 1957, 3) Harriman - 1959, 4) Paris Match magazine - 1963, 5) "KrgazVeVeu. Vetetegs" - 1970. There is another, sixth version, coming from the circles of the rehabilitated old Bolsheviks. This version was obtained under exceptional circumstances, which it is too early to write about...

Many of the old Bolsheviks rehabilitated during their lifetime took a prominent part in the commissions investigating Stalin's

crimes (the author of these lines knew some of them well from Moscow and the Caucasus). They were primarily interested

in: under what circumstances did Stalin die?

The version of the old Bolsheviks, of course, could also have been born under the influence of Khrushchev, who really

wanted to morally rehabilitate himself before them: here the initiator of the elimination of Stalin

Khrushchev speaks, and Beria is entrusted with only "dirty work." However, when analyzing the circumstances of Stalin's death, I did not use this version, with the exception of what relates to the "case of doctors." Why? For two reasons:

firstly, it is impossible to establish its true origin from here, from abroad; secondly, at some places in the story of the old

Bolsheviks there is a touch of Khrushchev's propaganda. Nevertheless, there are quite plausible scenes in this story.

According to this version, the events of February 28 - March 1 develop as described by Khrushchev: the four visited Stalin, they had a peaceful and fun dinner together, but the meeting took place

not at all

on the initiative of Stalin. It was proposed by Malenkov under the pretext that Stalin's instructions were needed.

on the issues to be discussed at the meeting of the Council of Ministers on Monday, 2 March. A week earlier, Stalin had informed the Bureau of the Presidium of the Central Committee that the trial of "doctors pests" was scheduled for mid-

March, and handed them copies of the "Indictment" signed by the Prosecutor General of the USSR. This document, like the comments of the Prosecutor General, a protege

Beria, Safonova, about the conversation with Stalin finally dispelled all doubts about the true

Stalin's intentions. It turned out that during the war the Americans managed to create their agent points not only in the Kremlin medical and sanitary department, but even in the Central Committee (Lozovsky) and the Ministry of State Security (Abakumov). The British did the same before the

war, and during the war they expanded their network by recruiting members of the Central Committee Kuznetsov, Popkov, Rodionov. Nothing was said about the

army, except that Vasilevsky, Govorov, Shtemenko, Konev were intended to be poisoned. But even here, between the lines, it was clear that only such

offended marshals as Zhukov, Voronov, Yumashev, Bogdanov could be interested in this. The question of who was interested in killing Zhdanov and

Shcherbakov remained open. However, everyone knew that Beria and Malenkov had never been on good terms with them, and if, for example,

Stalin really killed Zhdanov, then he killed him with the hands of Beria, like Kirov with the hands of Yagoda.

In a word, it became clear that the matter would not end with the process of doctors, but, as in 1937, heads roll and

many members of the Politburo. When Beria, Malenkov, Khrushchev and Bulganin studied this

document, then, at the suggestion of Khrushchev, they decided to collectively discuss the situation. The meeting took place in a forest near Moscow

under the guise of hunting (this topic was never discussed within the four walls). It was decided - because of Stalin's state of health, which did not allow him to

participate in the operational work of the party and government, to propose that he resign from all posts. But after all, Stalin, in order to gain time, could sign any document, and

Then

destroy its initiators. How to be? Khrushchev allegedly turned to Beria: "Lavrenty Pavlovich! You are an expert in such matters, but we don't understand a damn thing about it, tell me how to make sure that Stalin continues to live, but without interfering in the affairs of the party and the state?"

Beria took the hint and, without any equivocation, replied that Stalin behind bars would be even more dangerous than in the wild; even after death he will

interfere in affairs for a long time, if from he is not

dissociate. However, Beria did not offer anything concrete.

Then Malenkov proposed to force Stalin to read his resignation letter on the radio.

And

television, and then isolate it from the whole world on Solovetsky Island.

However, Beria declared that he and his Chekists could only vouch for the dead Stalin. This was what Khrushchev also thought, but he wanted to hear it from Beria.

Beria's sincerity was undeniable: after all, his own head was in danger. Malenkov, not without hesitation, joined Beria and Khrushchev.

A few days later, Beria invited Malenkov, Khrushchev and Bulganin to his dacha.

And

offered them two detailed plans: "small" and "optimal".

The "Small Plan" provided for the resignation of Stalin without the participation of outside forces. At Stalin's

at the next dinner with the four in Kuntsevo, a mortal blow should happen - such that he would not die immediately, but would not be able to survive either.

Stalin had to die in front of witnesses, in

including

such as his children and doctors.

The "optimal plan" provided for the explosion of Stalin's dacha when he was sleeping (that means during the day). Under the guise of food, it was

necessary to deliver dynamite to blow up not only Stalin's premises, but also adjacent buildings, in order to eliminate unnecessary witnesses at the same time.

All four should be responsible for the success of the "small plan", responsibility for the success

"optimal

plan" Beria took over personally. Each of these plans also included preventive measures: it was necessary to remove from Moscow, under various pretexts,

obvious supporters of Stalin, especially those who were in charge of the means of communication and information (Ministry of Communications, Radio and Television, TASS, the editors of Pravda and Izvestia) , as well as some prominent leaders from the Ministry of Defense, the Ministry of State Security,

the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the commandant's office of the Kremlin. At the same time, the most reliable supporters of the four

(Marshal Zhukov and others) should have been called to Moscow. All communication means of Stalin's dacha, his Kremlin apartment and office offices, starting from a certain X-hour, were disconnected from all general and special government wires. All cars, Stalin's dachas, guards and servants were "confiscated" from the beginning of X

hours.

All roads to and from the dacha - both by land and by air - were closed to everyone,

including

for all members of the Presidium of the Central Committee, except for the four.

The functions of the members of the four were clearly demarcated: Beria was responsible for "operational Part"

plan, Malenkov - for the mobilization of the party and state apparatus, Khrushchev - for the capital and communications, Bulganin - for monitoring the military.

From the very beginning of X-hour, the four announced Stalin's "serious illness" and took

hands of power "until his full recovery". So all actions were legalized

conspirators. Perhaps

the most original thing in this story is that the conspirators approved both plans at once! They decided to start with a "small plan", but in case of its failure, a backup, "optimal plan" was immediately launched. If a conspiracy, then with absolutely guaranteed success

—

after all, Stalin himself taught this ("it is necessary to beat the enemy for sure!"). After such preparation

And

the meeting of the four with Stalin took place at his dacha in Kuntsevo on the evening of February 28, 1953.

After talking about business matters and drinking heavily, Malenkov, Khrushchev and Bulganin leave quite early - but not for home, but for the Kremlin. Beria, as often happened, remains under the pretext of coordinating some of his measures with Stalin. Now there's something new on the scene

person: according to one version - a man, Beria's adjutant, and according to another - a woman, his employee. Informing Stalin that there is deadly data against

Khrushchev in connection with the "doctors' case", Beria calls his employee with a folder of documents. Before Beria had time to put the folder in front of Stalin, a woman splashed Stalin in the face with some kind of volatile liquid, probably ether. Stalin immediately lost consciousness, and she gave him several injections, introducing a slow-acting poison. During the "treatment" of Stalin in the following days, this woman, now in her capacity as a doctor, repeated them in such exact doses that Stalin did not die immediately, but slowly and

naturally.

Such is the story of the old Bolsheviks. At the same time, one involuntarily recalls that place from Alliluyeva's book, where a few words are said about some mysterious female doctor at the bed

dying Stalin: "The young doctors looked around in a daze ... I suddenly realized what is

I know this young female doctor—where have I seen her? We nodded to each other, but did not speak" ("Twenty Letters to a Friend", p. 7).

I think that clarifying the role of this female doctor under Beria would be very important. I wonder where Alliluyeva saw this woman before Stalin's death and whether she saw her after

his death?

In connection with the versions being analyzed, the following remark by A. Solzhenitsyn is also interesting: "There are signs that before Stalin's death,

Beria was in a threatened position - and maybe Stalin was removed through him" ("The Gulag Archipelago", vol. 1, p. 166 ).

In all versions told by two members of the Presidium of the Stalinist Central Committee and one Soviet

writer, three statements are strikingly unchanged:

1) Stalin's death is guarded by only four people from the Politburo - Beria, Malenkov, Khrushchev and Bulganin;

2) doctors are called to see Stalin only on the second day;

3) Beria is personally interested in Stalin's death.

There are two logical conclusions from this:

1) despite the exceptional severity of Stalin's illness (loss of consciousness), doctors were not deliberately called to see him until the four were convinced that a fatal outcome was inevitable;

2) since Beria alone was in charge of calling doctors (even on duty), he obviously called those who would do his will - help Stalin die.

These doctors, apparently, had nothing to do with the Medical and Sanitary Department of the Kremlin. At least Alliluyeva did not know any of them, and

Khrushchev says that he knew only

Professor Lukomsky. Not all the called doctors examined Stalin. They sat in neighboring rooms and, as Alliluyeva says, "metted" how to treat Stalin. Data

on the course of the disease and its symptoms were reported by another doctor, also unknown to anyone except Beria. The assumption about the cause of Stalin's illness can also be twofold:

1) Stalin received a blow when he was given an ultimatum about "doctors-pests" with a threat to use the armed forces;

2) Beria poisoned Stalin with a slow-acting poison.

So: either a blow from the Politburo, or poison from Beria?

Regarding a possible attempt on his life, Stalin had a certain complex all

East Asian despots - he was afraid of poisoning. Stalin considered any member of the Politburo to be a potential poisoner.

Khrushchev tells simply

anecdotal cases when, sitting down with his comrades-in-arms at the table, Stalin first forced each of them, under various, albeit very transparent pretexts, to

try everything that was served, and only after

this he himself began to drink and eat. Only Beria was not supposed to taste food: he ate only greens

and brought it with him (see: KBgizbsVeu. Vetetet, vo1. 1, p. 321). This is not a very plausible exception for Beria (from whom, according to the previous story,

Khrushche

wah, Stalin expected any meanness) Khrushchev does it, apparently to show how Beria could

outsmart Stalin himself.

That Stalin was most afraid of poisoning is also shown by the thoroughness with which He

he protected his fortress-dacha from the penetration of poison not only in food, but also in the air; "To his



The table brought fish from special ponds, pheasants and lambs from special nurseries, Georgian wine of a special bottle, fresh fruits were delivered from the south by plane. He did not know how many transportations were required at public expense to regularly deliver all this to the table ... the "base" existed mainly for special doctors to chemically analyze for poisons everything edible that was supplied to his kitchen. Each parcel with bread, meat or fruit was accompanied by a special "act", sealed and signed by the responsible "poisoner": "Poisonous substances were not found." Sometimes Dr. Dyakov would appear at our apartment in the Kremlin with his test tubes and "take an air sample" from all the rooms" (S. Alliluyeva. Only one year, pp. 335-336).

Of course, when Beria himself wants to poison Stalin, all these precautions will play no role, especially since

Poskrebyshev's "inner office" has disappeared, like General Vlasik, like all Stalin's doctors. After that, Stalin lived only by the grace of Beria.

The "Stalin problem" for Beria had already been resolved in principle, it was more important for him to get the friendly neutrality of the Molotovites and the active support of the members of the four. Khrushchev does not deny that Beria was able to deftly select people offended by Stalin: "Beria had a habit of recruiting into his network people who had difficulties with Stalin. He then used them for his own intrigue" (KBgazVsVeu. Vetethetf, vo]. 1, p. 95).

The course and outcome of the anti-Stalinist coup show the brilliant success of this method of "recruiting the offended."

In decisive moments, there was no one near Stalin; neither Stalin's "old guard" - the Molotovites, nor

Poskrebyshev's "most faithful squire", nor Vlasik's life guard, nor Vasily's devoted son, nor even Vinogradov's personal doctor. The death of Stalin guards and regulates Beria with the constant presence of his three accomplices - Malenkov, Khrushchev, Bulganin, who betrayed both Stalin and Beria.

At a rally on July 19, 1964, organized in honor of the Hungarian party government delegation led by

With Janos Kadar, Khrushchev publicly acknowledged the violent death of the Soviet dictator in a speech broadcast live throughout the USSR and via Pietroist throughout Eastern Europe: "Stalin fired on his own people. For veterans of the revolution. It is for this arbitrariness that we condemn him... In vain are the efforts of those who want

change the leadership in our country and take under protection all the abuses committed by Stalin ... And no one will whitewash (him - A. A.) - You can't wash a black dog white ...

(Applause.) There have been quite a few cruel tyrants in the history of mankind, but they all died in the same way from an ax, as they themselves supported their power with an ax "(Radio Moscow 1, July 19, 1964, 11.55 CET, monitor radio recording of the Svoboda station). Words about

tyrants, the newspapers Pravda and Izvestia were deleted when Khrushchev's speech was printed, but they were heard by many millions of people in the USSR and Europe.

The mystery of Stalin's death is not whether he was killed, but how it happened. Faced with the alternative of who to die - Stalin or the entire Politburo, the members of the Politburo chose Stalin's death. And as a human being, no one can blame them for such a choice.

It was one of the few cases in the history of the Soviet state when the interests of members governments coincided with the interests of the people.

#### THE END OF BERIA

Cover the traces of the crime and create an impeccable alibi for yourself - an instinctive reaction any the killers. The more intelligent the killer, the more skillfully he does it. But only murderers who have absolute power can create an absolute alibi for themselves. To cover their tracks, they commit a series of new murders: witnesses, perpetrators, close people of the victim disappear forever. However, only among Stalin and his disciples the organization of political assassinations of individuals, groups, classes and even entire nations for the first time became a special branch of criminal art with pre-made alibis.

Stalin was the only tyrant in history who killed not only enemies, but also their best friends, if his personal interests required it. At the same time, an alibi was created everyone the well-known devotion to him of those killed - Menzhinsky, Kuibyshev, Gorky, Ordzhonikidze, Ki

ditch. But Stalin covered his tracks in these cases too. Brother Kuibyshev (a hero of the civil war) and brother Ordzhonikidze (an old Georgian revolutionary) were shot. Some of Gorky's employees and close people were shot, including his personal secretary. The entire environment of S. M. Kirov was destroyed.

Stalin removed both the witnesses to the assassination of Kirov and all the perpetrators. Khrushchev said on XX congress: "It can be assumed that they were shot in order to hide the traces of the true organizers of the murder of Kirov" ("Report at a closed meeting of the XX Congress

CPSU",  
p. 19).

They will say that then they destroyed everyone indiscriminately. No, they did it very legibly. There was an unwritten law: the closer to Stalin was a person who was secretly killed by him, the more thoroughly his entourage was destroyed. This even applied to the family of Stalin himself: he shot his brother-in-law, the old Bolshevik Svanidze; he

shot his brother-in-law, the old

Chekist

Commissioner Redens; after the war he exiled the wife of his son Yakov, taking away her child; he arrested his wife's

sisters, the daughters of Lenin's friend Alliluyev. Why? When his daughter, perplexed, asked what the fault of her

aunts was, Stalin answered with sincerity unusual for him: "They knew too much" ("Twenty Letters to a Friend", p. 182).

That's for those who "knew too much," and took Beria immediately after Stalin's death. These, in addition to Beria's accomplices,

included: 1) two commissions of doctors - one that "treated" Stalin, and the other, which testified that Stalin was treated

"correctly"; 2) security and servants of Stalin at the dacha in Kuntsevo.

Most of the doctors from these two commissions disappeared immediately after Stalin's death. One of

doctors who participated in the autopsy of Stalin's body, Professor Rusakov, "suddenly" died. The medical and sanitary department of the Kremlin, responsible for the treatment of Stalin, is immediately abolished, and its head, I. I. Kuperin, is arrested. The Minister of Health of the USSR A.F. Tretyakov, who by rank headed both commissions, was

removed from his post, arrested, and together with Kuperin and two other doctors, members of the commission, were sent to Vorkuta. There he receives the post of chief physician of the camp hospital. Their rehabilitation

takes place only a few years later, and this proves that not only Beria, but the whole four, covered up their tracks.

Beria acted no less abruptly with Stalin's Kuntsevo guards and servants: after all, these people not only witnessed

what was happening around Stalin, but, obviously, told Vasily Stalin how Beria's "doctors" healed his father.

If Stalin had died of natural causes "under the constant supervision of the Central Committee of the CPSU and the Government," as the "Government Communication" said, then those "strange events" in Kuntsevo would not have occurred, which Stalin's daughter writes about, however, without going into the reasons for what is happening:

"The house in Kuntsevo experienced, after the death of his father, strange events. On the second day after the death

of his owner - there was no funeral yet - by order of Beria, they called together all the servants and guards, the entire

staff serving the dacha, and announced to them that things should be immediately taken out

from here (it is not known where), and everyone must leave this room. Arguing with Beria was

impossible

for anyone. Completely bewildered, not understanding anything, they collected things, books, dishes, furniture, loaded everything with tears onto trucks - everything was taken away somewhere, on some

warehouses... People who had served here for ten or fifteen years, not out of fear, but out of conscience, were thrown out into the street. They

dispersed everyone, whom where. Many officers from the security sent to

other cities. Two shot themselves on the same day. People did not understand anything, they did not understand what

their fault? Why are they so turned on?" ("Twenty Letters to a Friend", pp. 21 - 22).

Beria could have answered this in the same way as Stalin: they "knew too much." Therefore, they were sent to distant cities in order to liquidate them without trial and without noise.

Finally, there was another group of witnesses - Beria's accomplices: Malenkov, Khrushchev and Bulganin. Personalities themselves are not

outstanding, they nevertheless represented the most important institutions: Malenkov - the state bureaucracy, Khrushchev - the party apparatus, Bulganin - the army. With them, Beria thought to do what every self-respecting bandit does: to honestly divide the booty - power.

Being on the sidelines during the "treatment" of Stalin, they after his

death received from Beria all the legal party-state power with one unspoken reservation, embodied in the new Kremlin protocol of the hierarchy of leaders: Beria agreed to be the second person in the state in order to manage the first.

Beria was not only a policeman: as a politician, he was much higher than his colleagues and understood that an entire era was ending with Stalin,

that from now on to become great and successfully rule

Maybe

only anti-Stalin. Indeed, it turned out that you can conquer your own country with bayonets, but it is more than inconvenient to govern it, forever

sitting on these bayonets. "Descent on the brakes" - this seems to me the political program of Beria.

Of course, having only anti-Beria information from Soviet official history

And

knowing Beria himself as the country's supreme inquisitor for almost twenty years, it is hard to imagine that he could turn into his own

antipode. In politics, however, all sorts of metamorphoses are possible. Even Lenin prophetically predicted the rebirth of his

students: "History knows all

sorts of transformations; relying on conviction, devotion and other excellent spiritual qualities is not at all a serious thing in politics" ("

The Eleventh Congress of the RCP (b.). Verbatim Report. M. 1961, p. 28). And so it turned out when, in the words of Mussolini,

"Bolshevism

degenerated into Slavic fascism."

After Lenin's death, the party put forward the slogan: "Without Lenin, but along the Leninist path"—and hit the mark. Lenin abolished "war communism", introduced the New Economic Policy, retained the Soviets, limited the GPU, allowed creative associations in art without

surrealism, but with private publishing houses, fought proletcults, flirted with the Smenovokhites, promised

restore

all freedoms and rights (Party Program) - and died. The country agreed to follow this path. Is it now possible to say to the people: without Stalin,

but along the Stalinist path? From the endless stream of reports of seksots, Beria was the first member of the Politburo to know the answer of the

people to this question: a great sigh of relief, universal hopes for change. Beria was well aware that only using these hopes could success be achieved.

Not out of love for the people, not out of hatred for Stalin, and not out of remorse for the crimes committed, but based on political calculations and

personal interests in the new conditions, Beria decided to lead the reform movement. Killing Robespierre, the Thermidorians were not at all going to hand over the guillotine to the museum, but when they saw with what rejoicing the people met death

perpetrator of terror, they decided to take advantage of this misunderstanding and lead the movement for humanity. What Khrushchev did

with Stalin three years later at the Twentieth Congress (1956), Beria wanted to start now. He started it by releasing on April 4, 1953

"doctors-pests" and himself accusing the Stalinist-Beria police system of falsification, fabrication of cases and the Inquisition.

The beginning of de-Stalinization and even the emergence of the expression "cult of personality" is mistakenly associated with Khrushchev

and the 20th Congress: for the first time this expression was used three months after Stalin's death, when Beria was the de facto ruler of the

country. In the unsigned article "The Communist Party is the guiding and leading force of the Soviet people" (unconditionally published by

decision of the Presidium of the Central Committee) "Pravda" dated June 10, 1953

wrote:

".. remnants of anti-Marxist views on the role of the masses, classes, parties, elements of the cult of personality, long condemned by the party,

until very recently, took place in propaganda work, penetrated the pages of individual books, magazines and newspapers." The article stated: "the strength of our party and state leadership is in its collectivity", and "the essence of the policy of our party is set out in the

speeches of G. M. Malenkov, L. P. Beria and V. M. Molotov."

This hidden anti-Stalinist program of Beria was undoubtedly shared by Malenkov, but Khrushchev was against it, because it led to the popularity

of Beria and Malenkov, which was not part of his ambitious plans. At the same time, Khrushchev did not have any program of his own, his

only

did not like the creation of a new troika - Malenkov, Beria, Molotov.

Like any student of Stalin. Khrushchev was not interested in the program, Stalinist or anti-Stalinist, but in power, it was important to take this very "steering wheel of the party and state" from "those hands" into his own hands. We already know that Khrushchev achieved this later, but he

achieved it because none of his colleagues even thought that he could handle such a task ...

Here the history of the same party seemed to repeat itself again: Stalin was unanimously nominated for fast general secretary under Lenin, because he was considered "quiet" and mediocrity and were going to use him in their purposes. When nominating Khrushchev as acting first secretary of the Central Committee after Stalin's death, they thought about the same thing: a peasant, an idiot, a party cog, he can also be used for his own purposes, as Stalin did for twenty years ...

But back to Beria and the cult of personality. The best proof that the first initiator of the course of de-Stalinization was Beria personally, we find in the ideological life of the party. As soon as they finished with the mourning gibberish

In March, Stalin's name began to gradually disappear from the pages of newspapers and magazines. Stalin's writings cease to be published - volume 13 turned out to

be the last.

printing

the next volumes of his Works (14 and 15) are suspended, and then the set is scattered altogether. If in April and May the name of Stalin is still found in the editorials of Pravda, then for

for a whole month (from the end of May to June 29) Stalin is referred to only once! But after the arrest of Beria, the name of Stalin was mentioned only in one week

12 times with all adjectives in the superlative degree.

In the same plan of de-Stalinization, Beria began to revise the notorious "Stalinist national

politicians".

The attention of the outside world was riveted only to the "case of doctors", so dozens of "national cases" in the union and autonomous republics went unnoticed. All these

affairs were also created according to the standard of the 1930s: brutal gangs of "bourgeois nationalists" were operating in all the national republics of the

USSR, who were preparing the exit of their republics from the "fraternal family". After systematic mockery (in the 1920s) of everything

the Russians were now called upon to raise their imperial cudgel against the small peoples.

Beria, in whom the imperial gendarme easily got along with the Georgian chauvinist (after the deportation of the Chechens, Ingush, Balkars and Karachays, mountainous Chechnya and Mount Elbrus were annexed by the Georgian SSR on Beria's orders), he perfectly understood that the weak point of the Soviet Union was not a mythical capitalist environment, and the double encirclement of the peoples he conquered: on the outskirts of Russia and in the countries of Eastern Europe. Beria wanted

to return the national policy at least to its Leninist origins: the indigenization of the party state apparatus and the introduction of office work in the native language. This goal was served by the decision of the Presidium of the Central Committee of the CPSU of June 12, 1953, adopted on the report of Beria. It contained

says:

"The Presidium of the Central Committee of the CPSU decided:

1) to oblige all party and state bodies to radically correct position in the national republics, to put an end to the perversions of Soviet nationality policy;

2) to organize the training of cultivation and the wide promotion of people of the local nationality to leadership work; abolish the practice of nominating personnel not from the local nationality; dismissed nomenklatura workers who do not know the local language, recall to the disposal of the Central Committee of the CPSU;

3) conduct office work in the national republics in the native, local language.

The case was not limited to this ruling. In the national republics, they began to liquidate the institution of second secretaries. It was created by Stalin. It boiled down and boils down to the following: the first secretary of the Central Committee of the party of the union republic is appointed from the nationals, and the second secretary of the Central Committee is a Russian, directly from Moscow. No language, no history, no local culture

he does not know the people, and he does not need to know. He is Moscow's eyes and ears against potential separatism.

Only hopeless Don

Quixotes among the local first secretaries could seriously imagine themselves to be the first (such were, for example, Babaev in Turkmenistan, Mustafaev in Azerbaijan, Daniyalov in Dagestan, Mzhavanadze in Georgia, whom the Central Committee therefore dismissed). In fact, the first is the second, and the nominal first secretary is just a national props with him. Everyone knows this and everyone is used to it. In the national

republics there were and are positions that in general can only be occupied by Russians or Russified nationals. Such are the positions of commanders of military districts, heads of garrisons, heads of border detachments, chairmen of the KGB of the republics, ministers of the interior, managers of railways and air

lines, ministers of communications of the republics, directors of enterprises of allied significance, heads of the main departments of the Central Committee. First Deputy Chairmen of the Councils of Ministers of the Union Republics and First Deputies

all

ministers (where Russian is not a minister) are also necessarily Russian.

Beria understood and probably convinced others that it was in the interests of the party itself to abandon this ugly great-power practice and take a course

towards the indigenization of the party and state apparatus. We started with Ukraine and Belarus. There, even the first secretaries of the Central Committee were Russians: in Ukraine, L. Melnikov was replaced by the Ukrainian Kirichenko, in Belarus, Patolichev was replaced by the Belarusian

Zimyanin. In Latvia, the second secretary of the Central Committee V. Ershov was replaced by the Latvian V. Krumins.

The turn never reached the other union republics: on June 26, Beria was arrested. IN

including

other things, he was accused of relying on "bourgeois nationalists", as Ukraine, Belarus and Latvia were cited as examples!

The Stalinist national policy in the outskirts remained the same.

Two issues - the de-Stalinization of political life in general and national politics in particular - were

those two whales on which Beria was going to build his new program.

However, the party and the people still did not know anything about Beria's program, and Khrushchev had already begun to intrigue against her:

"The Presidium began to discuss Beria's memorandum on the national composition of government bodies in Ukraine. Beria's idea boiled down to the fact that local (non-Russian) cadres should lead their own republics ... Then the memorandum dealt with the Baltic republics and Belarus. In both cases, the principle of nominating local people to the leadership of the republics was emphasized. We decided that the post of first secretary of each republic should be occupied by a local person, and not by a Russian. It happened because

what in

On this issue, Beria's position was correct, but he pursued his own anti-Party goal. He called for the abolition of the practice of Russian dominance in the leadership of non-Russian republics. Everyone knew that this was in line with the party line, but at first people did not understand that Beria was putting forward this idea in order to increase national tension between Russians and non-Russians, between the central leadership in Moscow and the leaderships in the republics. In this regard, I took Malenkov aside and told him: "Listen, Comrade Malenkov, don't you see where this leads? We are headed for disaster. Beria is sharpening his knife." - "Yes, but what to do?" "The time has come to resist. We must not allow what he is doing." However, let us recall that Khrushchev began to intrigue against Beria even under the dying Stalin.

We saw how Khrushchev accused Beria that he did not hide his joy at the death of Stalin, but he himself, apparently, had difficulty hiding it. True, his joy was not complete: he was afraid of Stalin, but now he is even more afraid of Beria.

How to move Beria to Stalin (and at the same time deprive Malenkov of his first and last ally) - such was the problem to which Khrushchev devoted from now on all his exuberant energy and remarkable talent of a natural cunning. The situation created after the death of Stalin, he draws in very gloomy colors:

"When Stalin died, he left us a legacy of anxiety and fear. Beria more than who

or he took care that this fear and anxiety remained among us tenacious and constant. I have not believed Beria for a long time. Many times I convinced Malenkov and Bulganin that

I

I regard Beria as an adventurer in foreign policy. I knew,



that he is busy consolidating his position and placing his people in the most important posts."

We have no reason not to believe Khrushchev that it was he, Beria's accomplice in a conspiracy against Stalin, right there, at the bedside of the dying Stalin, who was plotting against Beria. It is characteristic that at first he organized the anti-Beria plot only with members of the four, and then only began to recruit against Beria and the other members of the Politburo, which was very easy. Soviet citizens were pleasantly dumbfounded when they read on July 10, 1953 in Pravda:

"Recently, the Plenum of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union was held. Plenum of the Central Committee of the CPSU, after hearing and discussing the report of the Presidium of the Central Committee - comrade. Malenkova G. M. o

criminal anti-party and anti-state actions of L. P. Beria, directed on

undermining the Soviet state in the interests of foreign capital and expressed in perfidious attempts to put the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the USSR over the Government and the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, decided to withdraw L.P. Beria from

composition

Central Committee of the CPSU and expel him from the ranks of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union as an enemy of the Communist Party and the Soviet people.

Beria was not at this plenum of the Central Committee, just as he was not at the trial in December. The trial of him was an ordinary performance that Beria staged many times over others, with the only difference being that the main character was no longer a man, but a corpse.

Khrushchev constantly told his foreign interlocutors how Beria was arrested and killed. Khrushchev's direct physical killers of Beria in different versions of the story are different people, but the plot of the story remains the same.

According to one of the stories, the end of Beria was like this. Khrushchev first convinced Malenkov

And

Bulganin, and then the rest of the members of the Presidium of the Central Committee, that if Beria is not liquidated

immediately, then he will liquidate all members of the Presidium. Everyone probably thought so, although everyone was afraid to tell the other about it. Khrushchev was not afraid. Only the technique of carrying out the operation against Beria was difficult.

The normal procedure—a free discussion of the accusation against him in the Presidium of the Central Committee or at its plenum—was completely out of the question. Fearing that as soon as Beria finds out about the charges against him, he will immediately

coup d'état and shoot down all his rivals. Only the classic weapons of all scoundrels remained: deceit, ambush, trap. And since in this part

Beria was a great master, it was necessary to multiply the dexterity of deceit by the skill of the trap.

Therefore, the operation against Beria was timed to coincide with the beginning of the summer maneuvers of the Soviet Army. Several Siberian divisions were also supposed to take part in the maneuvers of the Moscow Military District (not every case if Beria's supporters were in the Moscow divisions). At a meeting of the Council of Ministers, the Minister of Defense, his deputies and the Chief of the General Staff had to report on the progress of the maneuvers, and therefore many military men were invited. The agenda for this meeting, as usual, was circulated to the members of the Council of Ministers in advance with all sorts of draft decisions and with the names of all invited speakers and experts. In a word, the routine of routines. All showed up. Members of the government gathered in the meeting room of the Council

ministers, and those invited, including the military, settled down, again as usual, in the waiting room, from where the invitees are called into the hall only during the discussion of their issue. The first to discuss was the question of the course of maneuvers of the Soviet Army. IN

hall

a group of military men entered, led by Marshal Zhukov and the commander of the Moscow Military District, General Moskalenko. Malenkov declared the joint meeting of the Presidium of the Central Committee and the Council of Ministers open. And then he turned to Zhukov:

— Comrade Marshal of the Soviet Union, I propose to you on behalf of the Soviet government take under the custody of the enemy of the people Lavrenty Pavlovich Beria.

The military take Beria into custody and take him to the next room. The Presidium of the Central Committee begins to discuss the question of his future fate.

Now, Khrushchev said, we were faced with a difficult, equally unpleasant dilemma: keep Beria in custody and conduct a normal investigation, or shoot him right there, and then

issue a death sentence and judicial order. It was dangerous to make the first decision, because the entire apparatus of the Chekists and internal troops

stood behind Beria, and he could easily be released. We had no legal grounds to take the second decision to immediately shoot Beria. After

a comprehensive discussion of the pros and cons of both options, we came to the conclusion: Beria must be shot immediately, because no one will rebel because of the dead Beria. The executor of this sentence (in that

in the next room) in Khrushchev's stories, General Moskalenko appears once, Mikoyan another time, and even Khrushchev himself a third time. Khrushchev emphatically added: our further investigation of the Beria case fully confirmed that we correctly shot him.

T. Vitlin in his monograph about Beria writes:

"It is difficult to say for sure whether he was shot by Moskalenko or Khrushchev, strangled by Mikoyan or Molotov with the help of those three generals who grabbed him by the throat, as was also said. It is also difficult to say whether he was arrested on his way to the Bolshoi Theater 27

June (where all members of the Presidium, except for him, were present at the opera "The Decembrists" - 4. 4.), or he was arrested after a reception at the Polish embassy, or he was arrested at a meeting of the Presidium of the Central Committee ... Since Khrushchev launched several versions about the death of Beria and each subsequent one differs from the previous one, it is difficult to believe any of them.

It was generally accepted that Beria was arrested on June 27. As evidence, they referred to the absence of Beria at the above-mentioned opera. But in the same issue of the Izvestia newspaper, where

list members of the government who were present in the theater without Beria, a large political

article "The indestructible unity of the party and people", where Beria is referred to as one of the leaders of the party and state. However, the entire article is directed against de-Stalinization and Beria's national program. Phrases about "Leninist-Stalinist science" are repeated again.

O

communism", about the need to fight "against the bourgeois ideology of nationalism and cosmopolitanism" and that "the party has always warned and warns the Soviet people against carelessness and idleness, educates communists and all working people in the spirit of high political vigilance, in the spirit of intransigence and firmness in the struggle with internal

And

external enemies. This is the language of the Stalinist article ("Pravda", 01/13/53) against Beria!

Why Beria was mentioned as one of the leaders is unknown. The editors of Izvestia could not help but know that Beria was indeed arrested the day before this article, that is, June 26

1953, as officially reported by the USSR Prosecutor's Office (Pravda, 12/17/53).

The trial of Beria and his six assistants was staged on December 18-23, 1953.

IN

the verdict says that Beria was a foreign spy from 1919 until the day of his arrest (Musavatist in Azerbaijan, Menshevik in Georgia, English in the USSR). Further it is said that

Beria wanted to put the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the USSR over the party and the government in order to seize power, in order to then carry out "the restoration of capitalism and the restoration of the rule of the bourgeoisie"; Beria was against "improving the welfare of the Soviet people" and "sabotaged and interfered with the most important events of the Party in order to create food difficulties in our country", "defendant Beria L. Ts. and his

accomplices committed terrorist reprisals against people", "Beria L. Ts ... and his accomplices took a number of criminal measures in order to activate the remnants of bourgeois-nationalist elements in the Union republics", "the court found that the defendants Beria L.P., Merkulov V.N., Dekanozov V.G., Kobulov B. 3., Goglidze S. A., Meshik P. Ya. and Vlodzimirsky L. E., using their official position in the NKVD - MGB - MVD bodies, committed a number of grave

crimes with the aim of exterminating honest cadres devoted to the cause of the Communist Party and Soviet power. In all these crimes, the defendants pleaded guilty  
guilty.

On December 23, they were all sentenced to death. On the same day they were shot. An unprejudiced observer can easily see that in this guilty verdict, the real truth is side by side with a big lie. That Beria and his colleagues (both their predecessors and their heirs) are enemies of the people is true, but that they wanted to place their political police over the party and the government is a lie. There was no need for them to do this: for twenty years she had stood above the party and the government. That this trial in December took place over a group of Chekists is true, but that Beria was also present there is a hoax. Well-informed and closely offended by the Beria terror, S. Alliluyeva does not write anything about the trial of Beria. Moreover, it follows from her words that Beria was killed immediately after his arrest: "After Beria was arrested in June 1953 and immediately shot, some time later the government circulated a long secret document about his "crimes".

Reading it at party meetings took more than three hours in a row. In addition to the fact that Beria was accused of "international espionage in favor of imperialism", more than half of the secret letter of the Central Committee was devoted to his "immoral appearance." Party investigators enthusiastically rummaged through the dirty linen of a no longer dangerous enemy, and not one party meeting has ever been so exciting:

description

love adventures

the deposed "leader" was done with all the details. It is not known only what the Central Committee wanted  
convince the party masses: this had nothing to do with politics. To the inner-party struggle - too. The document did not explain anything, I did not convince of anything - except that the bigots from the Central Committee discovered their own dirty nature. After 1953, Beria's wife and son were deported from Moscow to the Urals" ("Only one year", pp. 357 - 358).

That Beria was not alive during his trial is also evidenced by a very solid source: according to the Great Universal Polish Encyclopedia, Beria was shot in June 1953.

Stalin once remarked: "Carelessness is an idiotic disease of our people." And he himself became a victim of this disease, underestimating the meanness of Beria. Beria also died from the same disease, overestimating his own meanness.

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Stalin made the famous words of Luther the motto of his behavior: "Here I stand and cannot do otherwise. May the god of history help me," with a slight correction: Luther had simply God, while Stalin had "the god of history." "I am not Stalin, but I am in Stalin," said the Bolsheviks.

It is clear that

such a personification of the entire party in his own person deprived Stalin of the freedom to maneuver according to some personal whim. The worst thing: like every god, Stalin

was not allowed to make mistakes. He knew that his first mistake would be his last - God would be brought down. And so it happened...

Tbilisi Danton still turned out to be a prophet...

#### A. Avtorkhanov. Once again about the "mystery of Stalin's death"

"The Riddle..." was first published in Russian in 1975, and then was translated into a number of European and Asian languages. In the Soviet Union, like my other books, it immediately fell under arrest - in a special guard. Nevertheless, through various channels, it also reached the Russian reader.

The Riddle... was also my first book to be released from arrest in early 1990. At the same time, the most important fragment from it was published in Slova, a literary, artistic and socio-political journal of the State Committee for Press of the USSR.

Back in December 1989, before the release of my books from arrest, the initiator  
printing

The journal Novy Mir came to me in the USSR and asked me for permission to publish a chapter from The Origin of Partocracy in the next issue of the journal. From the point of view of the still-existing censorship with its sharp dogmatic eye, the journal committed a blasphemous act - it chose the most pivotal, by its own definition, chapter: "The Tenth Congress and the state of siege in the party." It is dedicated to Lenin as the founder of the partocracy. The dogmatists from the Central Committee of the CPSU must have rebelled, and the March 1990 issue of the magazine in which this chapter was printed was published several months late, and subsequent issues were delayed even longer.

Despite the publicity, the abolition of censorship, the flow of exposing literature about Stalin and his crimes, the very central theme of my book - how Stalin died - is still little explored.

Recently, I happened to read a letter from Stalin's daughter Svetlana Alliluyeva addressed to

chief editor of the New York "New Journal" Roman Gul. History and content  
this

letters in a nutshell. As is clear from the correspondence between Alliluyeva and Gul, having learned from  
press about

the appearance of the book "The Mystery of Stalin's Death", S. Alliluyeva turned to R. Gul with a request to get her this book. Sending her his own copy, R. Gul asked S.

Alliluyev to  
write a review of it, adding that "I, too, may write about this book. Nothing is

This means that there will be two or three reviews of the book in Novyi Zhurnal, it's worth it, in my opinion.  
All the more  
so since your review (please write as you wished, it's just a letter to me about the book, that's best) is an  
exceptionally  
important review (be it positive or negative) "( " New Journal ", 1986, No. 165). The  
corresponding "letter  
of review" by S. Alliluyev and  
wrote

Gulya: "Only for you, a personal letter. Mr. Avtorkhanov, if you wish, show ... "R.

The ghoul didn't see fit to show it to me. I read it for the first time after Gul's death in N. and.". WITH.

Alliluyeva admits: "That the opposition to Stalin was at the top in 1952 - 1953 -  
very

probably". Complimenting me: "I must say that Mr. Avtorkhanov has exceptional knowledge of the life of the Soviet elite," S.  
Alliluyeva nevertheless rejected my version that Stalin died as a result of Beria's conspiracy. As can be seen from the further  
content of

her letter, S. Alliluyeva understands the term "conspiracy" very narrowly. Conspiracies can be in different forms: both in action and  
inaction. The conspiracy against Stalin was not, of course, a conspiracy of direct action to kill him, but was, in legal terms, a conspiracy  
of

"criminal inaction", when Stalin, who had received a heavy blow, was allowed to die without calling the doctors. S. Alliluyeva puts forward  
two theses

on this score, one contradicting the other: 1) "I have not seen and do not see any conspiracy or execution of such, in a villainous execution"  
and 2)

"From my two books it is clear: a seventy-three-year old man with high blood pressure certainly helped to die by leaving him in a state of  
shock

without medical assistance for 12 (and more ...) hours "(the words "helped die "are highlighted by Alliluyeva, and

rest

me. D. A.) (ibid., letter to S. Alliluyeva dated 01/23/77). It was this "helped to die" to Stalin by not summoning  
doctors that

I considered in the book to be the most probable form of Beria's conspiracy against Stalin's life.

S. Alliluyev also rejected my other version - her brother died not from alcoholism, but from politics, in other words, he was removed as  
a dangerous

witness. She wrote: "I would really like to see my brother Vasily so brave

a brave general, as Mr. A. describes him. Unfortunately, his brother was physically and mentally destroyed by alcohol ...

Let's not suspect murders here either ... "(emphasis added by S. Alliluyeva. - A. A.). S. Alliluyev's letter ends mysteriously: "My

two  
books

contain everything I knew: you just need to be able to read them carefully. Thanks for this Avtorkhanov,

however, according to comp65.

Twenty-five years after her first books and more than ten years after the criticism of my "Riddle ..." S. Alliluyeva wrote a new

"Book for Granddaughters", which will be published in the magazine "October" in Moscow. An excerpt from it was published by the Moscow News newspaper (10/21/90). In the new book, S. Alliluyeva revised some of her old estimates and

contributed

very important additions that are connected with the events in the Kremlin on the eve and in the first days after Stalin's

death. She writes: "It is appropriate, I think, to recall two events that took place in the winter of 1952-1953, events that preceded and followed

the death of my father. I didn't write about them in my early books. And their meaning is somehow revealed more precisely

over time, from a perspective. Now I think I see a certain connection between them, which I did not see clearly when I wrote Twenty Letters. In both of these events, the same person strangely figured ... I believe that it is necessary now to supplement

my old books with the following facts. The last conversation I had with my father was in January or February 1953. He suddenly called

me then and asked, as usual, bluntly: "Did you give me a letter from Nadirashvili?" - "No, dad, I don't know that." - "Okay." And he hung up. After Stalin's death, when

V

In the Hall of Columns, people passed by his open coffin, Stalin's daughter noticed in

composition

a large Georgian delegation of a "tall overweight man" in the clothes of a worker who stopped, delaying the progress of others. He "took off his hat and wept, smearing tears down his face and

wiping them with his shapeless hat. It was impossible not to notice and not remember his large figure. A day or two later, the

same Georgian appeared at the apartment of S. Alliluyeva. "Hello," he said in a thick Georgian accent. "I am Nadirashvili."

This name

Alliluyeva was recently named by her father. S. Alliluyeva let him into the apartment. He sat down, showed her a folder stuffed with

papers, and wept. "'Late! Late!' - all he said, adding that Beria "wanted to kill me ... he will never catch me ...". And then he

asked for the addresses of mar

Shalov Zhukov and Voroshilov. "I have to see Zhukov. I have to give everything to him. I collected everything about this man. He won't catch me."

Alliluyeva continues: "A day later ... the telephone rang, and I was surprised to learn that none other than Beria himself was calling me."

Beria politely, "brotherly", inquired about the affairs of S. Alliluyeva, said that the government would grant her a pension, and

unexpectedly got down to business: "This man, Nadirashvili, who was with you, where did he stay?"

Surprisingly, then S.

Alliluyeva, who wrote in her book that Beria was more cunning than Stalin, even now

Not

understands that this whole theater, starting from Nadirashvili's weeping in the Hall of Columns and

cumming him

a visit to her, just a reconnaissance provocation by Beria, and Nadirashvili is just an undercover pseudonym for a secret agent

Beria. The same theater Beria, no doubt, arranged around her gullible and temperamental brother Vasily. Probably, Vasily

succumbed to provocations,

What

could serve as a direct reason for his arrest, and Alliluyeva got off with a severe reprimand with a warning "for assisting

the well-known slanderer Nadirashvili." The well-known inquisitor Shkiryatov reprimanded her at

the denunciation of the same Beria. After the execution of Beria, the reprimand was removed, but his brother was not released.

This indicates that Vasily was removed from the will not only by Beria, but by the whole four. The new book by S. Alliluyeva also sheds

light on the events connected with the defeat of Stalin's "inner cabinet" headed by General Poskrebyshv. In "The Riddle..." I wrote

that the conspiracy against Stalin could only be successful

after the liquidation of the generals loyal to him: the head of the "inner office" General Poskrebyshv, the head of the personal

guard General Vlasik, as well as Stalin's personal doctor Academician Vinogradov. I argued that Beria probably provoked

Stalin indirectly so that he himself would carry out this operation. Now it becomes clear that Beria used the same Nadirashvili

for this purpose. Why?

The answer to this question follows from Alliluyeva's further presentation: "When, on the afternoon of March 1, 1953, the servants found my father lying unconscious near the table with telephones on the floor and demanded that a DOCTOR be called immediately, no one did. Of course, such old campaigners as Vlasik and Poskrebyshv would have immediately ordered without notifying the government and the doctor would have arrived right there. Here

To prevent this from happening, Beria, by denunciations of his imaginary enemy Nadirashvili, provoked the ever-suspicious

Stalin to remove people loyal to him from his entourage. S. Alliluyeva states this fact, not understanding its background, when she writes: "The mysterious Nadirashvili, as I believe, nevertheless managed to somehow convey to Stalin something

about Beria's activities. Immediate arrests of persons closest to Stalin followed: General of the Guard N. S. Vlasik, personal secretary

A. N. Poskrebyshv. It was January-February 1953. Academician V. N. Vinogradov was already in prison." The

"mysterious Nadirashvili", of course, did not write anything "about the activities of Beria", for Stalin removed not Beria, but his own

faithful and devoted assistants.

In the chain of circumstantial evidence of Beria's conspiracy against Stalin, which I collected in "The Riddle ...",



The "mysterious Nadirashvili" was just the missing link. I claimed that exactly

Beria provoked Stalin into destroying his "inner cabinet". Why was it necessary to start the conspiracy with the destruction of this cabinet? Let me remind

you that I wrote in "The Riddle ...": "Deprive

Stalin of this "cabinet", and then he is in your hands - such was Beria's plan. It was necessary to remove from Stalin his personal doctor, the head of his personal bodyguard, the head of his personal office, his representative in the Kremlin, the commandant of the Kremlin. They could only be removed by hand.

most

Stalin. Here Beria was in his element.

To her previous observations that government leaders "helped die" to Stalin by not calling the doctors after his blow, Alliluyeva adds new significant

facts: "The doctor was not called for the next 12-14 hours, when the drama was played out at the dacha in Kuntsevo : servants and guards, having rebelled,

demanding the immediate call of a doctor, and the government assured them that "there is no need to panic." Beria argued that

"nothing is

happened, he is sleeping. And with this verdict, the government left, only to return back in a few hours, since all the guards and all the servants were

now seriously furious. Finally, members of the government demanded that the patient be transferred to another

room, undressed and put on the bed - STILL without doctors ... Finally, the next morning, the whole circus began with the Academy of Medical

Sciences - as if an academy was needed to determine the diagnosis! Not earlier than at 10 o'clock in the morning, the doctors finally arrived ... All the servants

and guards, who demanded the immediate call of a doctor, would

whether fired. Everyone was ordered to be silent... They were silent. But ... in 1966, one of those who had worked at the dacha in Kuntsevo for almost twenty years came to me and told me the whole story above. Alliluyeva reports that she "did not write about this in Twenty Letters" ... I did not want

that in 1967, when I did not return to the USSR, anyone in the West might think that I "fled" simply from feelings of personal hurt or revenge. She adds that she also did not write everything she knows about her brother's death.

The cause of Stalin's death is absolutely clear - the deliberate failure to provide timely medical care to the patient, but another question still remains a

mystery: there was a natural blow or he

was called artificially by Beria's medical agents on that last night of February 27, when the four were drinking with Stalin. This will probably remain a Kremlin

secret for a long time to come.

The new data of S. Alliluyeva confirm my version of the fate of my brother, which she

denied in a letter to R. Gulya. Now she writes: "He (brother Vasily. - A.A.) was also "helped to die" in his Kazan exile, having assigned to him an informant from the KGB under the guise of a nurse. The fact that she was a paid agent of the KGB was known (and warned me) at the Vishnevsky Institute, where she worked and where Vasily lay for some time on examination ... Vasily, of course, knew much more than I did, since they talked to him all serving the Kuntsevo dacha on the same days of March 1953. He tried to meet foreign correspondents and talk to them. He was followed and eventually arrested. The government did not want to have him free. Later, the KGB simply "helped" him die." I feel that even now, in the era of glasnost, S. Alliluyeva does not want or is not free to tell what Vasily's accusations were based on when he stated that "they killed their father, they

his poisoned!" After all, she testified to us that he shouted about this not only in Kuntsevo, but also at Stalin's funeral on Red Square.

Another observer - also of high rank, the son of Georgy Malenkov, Doctor of Biological Sciences Andrei Georgievich Malenkov - also writes about the events associated with the death of Stalin. An excerpt from his future book was published by The Journalist (1991, No. 2). From it, I want to quote here the place that concerns our topic: "Stalin's despotic personal power was built on the balance of three forces: partyocracy, repressive bodies and technocrats."

According to A. Malenkov, the partyocracy was headed by Khrushchev, the technocracy by Malenkov, and the repressive bodies, of course, by Beria. However, "Stalin needed a balance of power. But the closer he got

its inevitable end, the more Stalin relied on Malenkov ... in the fight against Malenkov

Beria could not count on Stalin's support. So he decides to set the stage for the elimination of both of them. To this end, he inflates the "case of doctors", giving it an ominous hysterical coloring and scope. The calculation was simple: by accusing the Kremlin doctors of intentionally improper treatment and poisoning of representatives of the highest authorities, it is possible to safely remove both Malenkov and Stalin using medical methods ...

"Father, as I know, immediately

Understood

the meaning of this campaign, but for the suspicious Stalin, concrete evidence was needed - after all, the "doctors' case" was led by Ryumin, who had just been elevated by Stalin. Therefore, the father instructs S. D. Ignatiev to keep a close eye on Ryumin and his team. And a month later, Ignatiev reports to his father that he has data that reveals the true

design

"doctors' business". Malenkov and Ignatiev report these data to Stalin, who pronounces Not

the phrase that leaves doubts: "In this case, look for the Big Mingrel" (in mafia jargon - Beria). An immediate threat loomed over Beria: he became a danger to Stalin himself. Then Beria decides on a direct fight with the formidable Boss. In December 1952 he organizes

a raid on Stalin's dacha, eliminates all people loyal to Stalin (in particular, Poskrebyshev, Vlasik) and surrounds him with his people. The last action of the regime is being prepared, which should

was to destroy its creator. I do not know whether Beria completed this plan or whether Stalin died a natural death. In any case, there is also no complete reason to deny the possibility that Beria killed Stalin.

However, objective facts speak for the fact that Malenkov, Khrushchev and Bulganin also participated in Beria's conspiracy. After all, only they, together with Beria, spent the night next to the dying Stalin, they guarded his death, they, together with Beria, refused to call a doctor

To

patient until death is clearly indicated. Another thing is indisputable: the four was an artificial and contradictory combination created by calculation. Each

of the four - Beria, Malenkov, Khrushchev, Bulganin - marked himself as Stalin's heirs: Beria, Malenkov and Khrushchev claimed this by their ranks in the hierarchy, leaders, and Bulganin, as the Americans say, as topics

noah horse, that is, a colorless compromise candidate.

In my work, I analyzed only one political side of the riddle of Stalin's death: whether a conspiracy was organized in the Kremlin against Stalin's life. Analyzing all available to me

official and unofficial documents on the political situation in the country and at the top of the Kremlin by the beginning of 1953, weighing all aspects of the famous case of the Kremlin "killer" doctors and its political and strategic intent, looking closely at the objective logic of the development of political events on the eve and in the first days after death Stalin, studying the materials of the 20th Congress of the CPSU and the campaign to expose Stalin's personality cult, reading, finally, the memoirs of Khrushchev and Alliluyeva, I came to the conclusion in my book: the mystery of Stalin's death is not whether he was killed, but how happened. I still hold onto this conclusion. Close to him is Svetlana Alliluyeva, who so unconvincingly disputed

him in  
feedback letter.

To investigate the first side of the riddle, I relied on the so-called circumstantial evidence, but in order to find out the second side of the riddle, how Stalin was killed, direct evidence is needed.

—

forensic. On the eve or in the first days of Stalin's illness, the four, headed by Beria, removed from their posts the Minister of Health of the USSR, as well as the head of the Kremlin Medical and Sanitary Department. Both positions were taken by trusted people of Beria. The goal is clear: they must lead the commission for the "treatment" of Stalin. After Stalin's death, another commission was created, headed by the same persons - this commission should confirm that the first

commission

correctly diagnosed Stalin's illness and treated him correctly, all the more so, as the official communique pointed out, "the treatment of Comrade Stalin is carried

out under the constant supervision of the Central Committee of the CPSU and the Soviet Government." The second commission testified to what was demanded of it: "The data of the pathoanatomical study established the irreversible nature of I.V. Stalin's illness." This "data" is not for anyone.

known.

They remained secret. In addition, in order to investigate the autopsy data on did not

Whether a dead person is a victim of a crime, what is needed is not a commission of doctors, even from academicians, but experts from a special field of medicine - forensic medicine. Of course, there were no such experts in the commission, and therefore the real cause of Stalin's death remained unknown.

The cause of death also remained unknown.

Vasily Stalin. S. Alliluyeva notes: "On March 19, 1962, he (Vasily) died under mysterious circumstances. There was no medical report, no autopsy...

We

we don't know

in the family from which he died ... they still do not want to disclose all the circumstances.

If the rule of law is not an empty shell, then it is necessary to investigate not only the crimes of Stalin, but also the crimes against Stalin and his son.

Such an

investigation is possible even now, since their remains were not cremated, and some of the members of the Beria commissions are probably still living.

Before me now lies the verbatim report of the plenum of the Central Committee of the CPSU of July 2-7, 1953, at which the "Beria case" was

discussed. This report was kept in strict confidence for thirty-eight years and is only now published for the first time in Izvestia of the Central Committee

of the CPSU (1991, No. 1, 2). At this plenum, G. M. Malenkov made a report on Beria's conspiracy against the party and the government. All members of

Stalin's Politburo, plus a number of ministers and local party secretaries, took part in the debate. Both the speaker and the speakers in the debate proved

one thing: there was no conspiracy of Beria against the new leadership, but there was a conspiracy of this new leadership against Beria, which was led by a group consisting of Khrushchev, Malenkov, Bulganin, Kaganovich and Molotov. Other members of the Stalinist Politburo, Voroshilov and Mikoyan,

joined the conspiracy against Beria at the very meeting of the Presidium of the Central Committee of the CPSU on June 26, 1953, at which Beria was

arrested and, probably, shot a few hours later, because I do not consider the following words of Kaganovich at the plenum to be an accidental slip of the

tongue : "The Central Committee destroyed the adventurer Beria" ("Izvestia of the Central Committee of the CPSU", 1991, No. 1, pp. 192 - 193).

For

what? For the fact that Beria wanted to carry out de-Stalinization in domestic and foreign policy, which we will see from the analysis of the reports

debate.

I analyzed the report of the July plenum of the Central Committee of the CPSU with the attention that this historical document deserves in the light of the events and problems I have already studied in The Mystery of Stalin's Death. Such an analysis only reinforced my old conviction that in the last months of Stalin's life two conspiracies developed within the leadership: one was a conspiracy of the four (Beria, Malenkov, Khrushchev, Bulganin) led by Beria against Stalin, the second

swarm - a conspiracy within the four (Khrushchev, Malenkov, Bulganin) led by Khrushchev against Beria. Let me remind you what is said in the "Riddle ..." in relation to both conspiracies. First, about the conspiracy against Beria. Khrushchev said that even when Stalin fell ill, he told Bulganin: "If Stalin dies, Beria wants to become Minister of State Security. If he becomes one, then this is the beginning of the end for all of us ... We absolutely must not allow

this.

Bulganin said that he agreed with me ... I said that I would talk about all this Art.

Malenkov. I took this from the English text "Kvgazvsveu Vetetegu", published in

America. The Kremlin forced the pensioner Khrushchev to declare in the pages of Pravda his authentic memoirs, dictated by him on a tape recorder, to be a fake of the CIA.

The report of the plenum confirms that the conspiracy of three of the four - Khrushchev, Malenkov and Bulganin - was formed even when Stalin was fighting death. Here is Khrushchev's speech at the plenum: "... about a day before the death of Comrade Stalin, I said to Comrade Bulganin:

"... after the death of Stalin, Beria will rush by all means to the post of Minister of the Interior ... this will lead to very bad consequences for the party." Bulganin:

"There was such a conversation" (ibid., pp. 149-150). And here is Bulganin's speech: "Govarishch Nikita Sergeevich Khrushchev, before the death of Comrade Stalin, really spoke to me about Beria ..." As you can see ... we

we are standing on the eve of the death of our leader, but I foresee and fear that Beria will greatly complicate

case. I foresee that when Stalin dies, he will rush to the Ministry of Internal Affairs. Why do you think he needs the Ministry of Internal Affairs? Then, in order to ... subjugate the party and the state"" (ibid., pp. 172 - 173).

So the conspiracy against Beria was formed even within the big conspiracy against Stalin himself. However, the conspiracy against Beria did not mean at all that the troika thereby wanted to rehabilitate Stalin and condemn Beria for having launched a campaign against Stalin's personality cult. This is how Stalin's old comrades-in-arms Voroshilov, Kaganovich, Andreev understood Beria's revelations. They, members of the Presidium of the Central Committee, like the entire Central Committee, did not know and

Not

could know that the condemnation of the cult of personality and the overthrow of Stalin were a joint decision all

members of the four. They overthrew Beria not because he, together with them, overthrew Stalin from the throne of the dictator, but because he wanted to take his place himself. It was because of this ignorance that such speeches were made at the plenum:

Kaganovich: "He (Beria. - A. A.) began the attack on the party with an attack on Stalin. The day after Stalin's death, when Stalin was still lying in the Hall of Columns, he actually began prepare

coup, began to overthrow the dead Stalin, he began to stir up, dirty tricks, he said that Stalin said this about you, about the other one, then he said that Stalin was going against him, Beria. He ... told us: "Stalin did not know that if he tried to arrest me,

then security officers

would stage an uprising." Did you say it? Voices from the Presidium: "He spoke." "Beria was hostile to statements that Stalin was the great successor to the cause of Lenin, Marx-Engels ... and all this was presented under the guise of the fact that we now need to live in a new way" (ibid., pp. 196 - 197; highlighted me 4. 4.);

Andreev: Beria "began to discredit the name of Comrade Stalin ... He did it deliberately in order to bury the name of Comrade Stalin and to make it easier to come to power ... Name

Comrade Stalin disappeared (from the press - 4. A.) ... this is his hand ... The question of the cult of personality appeared from somewhere. Why did this question arise? ... These are the tricks of Beria. Voroshilov from the Presidium: "Correct" (ibid., No. 2, p. 185).

These speeches by former members of the Stalinist Politburo in defense of Stalin and his policies  
How

the continuer of Lenin's cause was put before the troika (Malenkov, Khrushchev and Bulganin) with a grave necessity: how to condemn Stalin's personality

cult without whitewashing Beria himself? In his final speech, Malenkov was forced to condemn the cult of Stalin, but in a purely business aspect: "Here at the Plenum of the Central Committee they spoke about the cult of personality and, it must be said, they spoke incorrectly ... First of all, we

must openly admit, and we propose to write this down in the decision Plenum of the Central Committee that in our propaganda in recent years there has been a deviation from the Marxist-Leninist understanding of the question of the role of the individual in history ... You should know that the cult of personality

of Comrade Stalin in the daily practice of leadership has assumed painful forms and dimensions, the methods of collectivity in work were discarded" (ibid., p. 195).

Malenkov

He added that the congress had not been convened for thirteen years, the plenums of the Central Committee had not been convened for years, the Politburo

was not working. "We have no right to hide from you that such an ugly personality cult has led to peremptory individual decisions and in recent years has begun to

cause serious damage to the leadership of the party and the country" (ibid.). Malenkov also referred to the well-known speech

Stalin's decision against Molotov and Mikoyan at the October plenum of the Central Committee (1952), then Malenkov turned to the audience

with the question: "Did the Plenum of the Central Committee, did we all agree with this? No! But we were all silent. Why? Because the cult of personality

was brought to the point of absurdity and there was complete lack of control. Do we want something like this in the future? Decidedly not" (ibid., p. 196). Malenkov immediately criticized Stalin's "economic problems of socialism in the USSR", which he, like all speakers, praised so

highly in the report of the Central Committee of the CPSU to the Twentieth Party Congress. How firmly and deeply the "sacred" image

of "God" Stalin was absorbed into the blood and brain of the partyocracy is shown by the memorable fact that even after such a speech by the then

first leader of the party and the state, Malenkov, supported by the second leader, Khrushchev, as well as the corresponding resolution of this

plenum of the Central Committee CPSU, a new epidemic of the cult of Stalin broke out in the country on the same scale. As for the criminal

offenses of Beria against the new leadership, many of the accusations are far-fetched, far-fetched, and serious political accusations against Beria,

on the contrary, testify to the correctness and political farsightedness of Beria. Malenkov accused him of the following:

1) Beria eavesdropped on our telephone conversations and spied against us through our personal

guards;

2) Beria wanted to liquidate the GDR and create a united bourgeois Germany;

3) Beria wanted to restore normal relations with Yugoslavia;

4) Beria announced an amnesty for prisoners in order to raise his authority;

5) Beria was engaged in atomic affairs, ignoring the Central Committee, and without the knowledge of the Central Committee organized the explosion of a hydrogen bomb;

6) Even under Stalin, Beria sowed distrust among members of the leadership;

7) Beria got the Central Committee of the CPSU to make an erroneous decision to pursue a new national policy in the union republics on the basis of a new "indigenization", that is, to appoint representatives of indigenous nationalities to leading positions in the party and state apparatuses of the republics, by this he deliberately wanted to quarrel the nationals with the Russians ( as an example, Malenkov

pointed to the decisions of the Central Committee of the CPSU on Ukraine, Lithuania);

8) Beria, bypassing the Central Committee, personally released on behalf of the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs those arrested by Stalin from

1946 to 1953, the general

fishing, ministers, doctors-"pests", "Mingrelians" and others, in order to raise their authority;

9) Beria - "a criminally decomposed person" (ibid., No. 1, pp. 143 - 151).

To all these accusations, Khrushchev himself added such a "terrible" accusation, according to Rakosi's report on Hungary, Beria said that state affairs should study government, and "Let the Central Committee deal with cadres and propaganda" (ibid., p. 153). Finding the list of Malenkov's criminal charges against Beria not significant enough, Khrushchev proposed declaring Beria a spy literally in the following words: "Beria can be a spy" (ibid.). The resolution of the plenum of the Central Committee will later write down: Beria was "an agent of international imperialism" (ibid., p. 205).

After the war, Beria did not directly supervise the state security agencies, but supervised them as Stalin's deputy in the Council of Ministers of the USSR. Beria was very critical of the activities of the "organs" after his departure from there. This, of course, may simply be the former boss's professional jealousy, but Khrushchev himself remarks: "He himself sometimes resented what was being done in the Ministry of Internal Affairs or the MGB" (ibid., p. 153). Mikoyan, in his speech at the plenum, said how Beria motivated his desire to again head the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs. Mikoyan began by confirming: "It must be said that Comrade Stalin has not trusted Beria lately. Beria was forced to admit at the last meeting of the Presidium of the Central Committee for him,

What

Comrade Stalin did not trust him that the Mingrelian case was created in order to On this reason to arrest Beria, that Stalin did not have time to complete what he wanted "(ibid., No. 2, p. 150).

Then Mikoyan put up a very important evidence of Beria's motives to head the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs

after Stalin: "Once I asked him: why do you need the NKVD? And he answered: it is necessary restore legality, such a situation in the country cannot be tolerated. We have a lot of arrested people, they need to be released and people should not be sent to camps in vain. The NKVD must be reduced, we do not have security, but supervision over us ... leave one or two people to protect members of the Government. These are the statements he made" (ibid., pp. 150 - 151). Of course, both Khrushchev and Mikoyan consider all this "double-dealing" Beria.

I remain of my opinion that both the plenum of the Central Committee in July 1953 and the Supreme Court of the USSR in December 1953 tried not a living Beria from prison, but a dead man. So don't

Beria's testimony was read at the preliminary investigation before the plenum of the Central Committee in July 1953, therefore, Beria's testimony before the Supreme Court in December 1953 was not reported. Probably, most of the members of the plenum of the Central Committee were informed about the death of Beria, except for his close friends and henchmen of Beria in the party apparatus, such as, for example, the first secretary



Central Committee of Azerbaijan and candidate member of the Presidium of the Central Committee of the CPSU Bagirov. Hence, the laughter in the hall is also understandable, caused by Bagirov's answer to one of Malenkov's remarks. Bagirov, in his very confused and timid speech, began to tell that Beria had recently called him, that he wanted to create new republican orders. When Malenkov began to attack Bagirov with questions about what orders and for whom, the bewildered Bagirov said: ask Beria about this, which caused laughter in the hall.

Analyzing numerous clues, studying the atmosphere inside and at the top of the party, the logic of the development of political events, the psychology of their leading participants, I came to the conclusion in *The Mystery of Stalin's Death*: even during the life of the sick Stalin, his students carried out a political coup against the dictator. Let me remind you what the book says on this score: "The Four - Beria, Malenkov, Khrushchev and Bulganin - carried out a coup on the night of February 28 to March 1, 1953, veiled by reference to the illness of Stalin, who temporarily resigned from power. The Four immediately distributed power among themselves, bypassing the Presidium of the Central Committee of the CPSU. All the other heirs of Stalin from the Politburo - old, legitimate, but not involved in the coup - got secondary roles. Is this conclusion confirmed by the analysis of the materials of the July plenum? It would be stupid

to think that one of the participants in the coup would admit this to the Stalinist Central Committee, but on the other hand, the Gorbachev Central Committee - wittingly or unwittingly - betrayed a great secret in its truly historical note 41 to Molotov's speech: "On March 5, 1953, a joint meeting of the Plenum of the Central Committee of the CPSU was held, the Council of Ministers of the USSR, the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, which lasted from 20 h. up to 20 o'clock. 40 min., i.e. ended in 1 hour 10 minutes. until the death of I.V. Stalin (as reported in the notice of the death of I.V. Stalin, he died on March 5, 1953 at 21:50). Decisions were made at the meeting

By

organizational issues - on the Chairman and First Deputy Chairmen of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, on the Presidium of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, and its composition, on the Chairman and Secretary of the Presidium of the Verkhovno

th Soviet of the USSR, on the unification of a number of ministries and the appointment of ministers, on the chairman of the State Planning Committee of the

USSR and the chairman of the All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions, as well as on the composition of the Presidium and secretaries of the Central Committee of the CPSU.

The decision of the joint meeting was published in the press on March 7, 1953, without indicating the date of its holding "(ibid. No. 1, p. 160; highlighted by me. - A. 4.). There really is no doubt: Stalin's power passed to his diadochi when Stalin was still breathing. Now it is already clear why Khrushchev and Mikoyan so insistently emphasized in their speeches at the plenum that doctors from the very

start

Stalin's illness they were told that Stalin's death was inevitable. A lie designed to justify the seizure of power from the still-living Stalin. It is not in medical ethics to say that a patient, and even one like Stalin, has no chance of recovery. After all, the same Khrushchev

said that one of the  
doctors continued to treat the dead Stalin until one of the four said: "Don't you see, the man died."

What policy did Beria want to pursue, becoming the de facto ruler of the country after Stalin's death? In  
"The Riddle ..."

I answered this question as follows: "Beria was not only a policeman: as a politician, he was much  
higher than his  
colleagues and understood that an entire era had ended with Stalin, that from now on only an anti - Stalin ... the de-  
Stalinization of political life in general and national politics in particular were

those

two whales, on which Beria was going to build his new program. (I must apologize to the readers that I took up self-  
quoting, this is because the literary KGBists declared the "Mystery of Stalin's Death" a mythical work.) The speeches  
of the  
organizers of the conspiracy against Beria testify with absolute certainty that Beria did not want to repair  
the Stalinist  
system, but to destroy it that did not suit anyone - nor

conspirators against Beria, nor a party with an army. What was the Beria alternative in a concrete  
sense remains in  
question. In the light of subsequent developments, especially in the Gorbachev era, it becomes clear how  
far Beria  
looked. From the speeches of the anti-Beria conspirators at the plenum, some of the priorities of Beria's  
future policy are  
still visible:

- 1) the elimination of the repressive system of Stalin - Beria;
- 2) consolidation of policy in the European satellite countries, starting with the elimination of "socialism" in the  
GDR and the unification of the two Germanys;
- 3) prevent the collapse of the USSR by returning to the Leninist policy of "indigenization";
- 4) the transfer of power from the party apparatus to the state apparatus.

All this did not suit the partyocracy, hence the conspiracy against Beria. Of course, personal motives also  
played  
a huge role in the actions of the conspirators. After Stalin's death, the accomplices of the anti-Stalinist  
conspiracy saw that they had exchanged one dictator for another. Deprived of Stalin's gift for diplomacy in  
dealing  
with potential opponents and euphoric over the brilliant success of his plot against Stalin, Beria, overestimating  
himself, began to chop off the shoulder. Already his first step was reckless - he actually appointed the post-  
Stalinist  
government despite Molotov's demand to recommend the government on behalf of the Central Committee of the  
CPSU, and not on behalf of Beria alone (Molotov spoke at the plenum about his call to Beria on  
this matter and  
about Beria's refusal to accept his proposal). Such

+++

his actions are assessed in the resolution of the plenum of the Central Committee as an attempt to put the political police over the party. Absurd. Since the 1930s, Stalin himself placed it above the party, and Beria only took advantage of this legacy of the personality cult to quickly organize a new

"provisional government", and then we'll see. In the "provisional government" Beria took on

assume the role of the second leader to rule the first. Everyone saw it, and no one seemed to resent it. Legally, the first leader himself, the classic of this system,

Malenkov, was not indignant, the colorless bureaucrat Bulganin was not indignant, however, Molotov and Kaganovich were indignant: the first with the fact that Beria did not follow the traditional procedure for appointing the government through the Central Committee of the CPSU, and the second with the fact that Beria in the presence of the entire Presidium of the Central Committee says all sorts of "dirty things" about Stalin. Voroshilov and Mikoyan turned out to be generally unperturbed: Stalin was good for them, now Beria is good for them too. However, one "disturber" was

nevertheless found, which Beria listed as political clowns, capable in his eyes of the role of an entertainer, and not a serious politician - Khrushchev.

But the "entertainer" turned out to be in the Stalinist art of sudden

blows a class above Beria himself. As we learned from the speeches of Khrushchev and Bulganin on

plenum, Khrushchev, who recruited Malenkov and Bulganin against Beria during Stalin's illness (all three lived in the same house, which made it easier

conspiracy at meetings), began to look for new allies. After the death of Stalin, Khrushchev very easily convinced Molotov and Kaganovich that Beria

was and remained their enemy and was aiming  
V

dictators.

Thus, an authoritative majority against Beria was created in the reorganized Presidium of the Central Committee of the CPSU. At the same time, Khrushchev and Bulganin also picked up a team from among the military, led by Marshal Zhukov, to arrest Beria. The technique for the

execution of the conspiracy was ingeniously simple: to arrest Beria at the next meeting of the government. First of all

Khrushchev and, according to his direction, Malenkov conducted preliminary training during their solitary walks with Beria, suggesting to him that in their person he had deeply devoted like-minded people and loyal comrades-in-arms (participation in a conspiracy against Stalin is the best proof).

Khrushchev told the plenum what the purpose of such "friendship" was: "Some said:  
how

Thus, Malenkov often walks hand in hand with Beria... Khrushchev also walks with him... I believe that for the time being this walk was beneficial to us and was

necessary. On Thursday (June 25, 1953), we - Malenkov, Beria and I - were traveling in the same car, although we knew that he was an intriguer,

that he me

intrigues against Malenkov and against others ... He says goodbye, shakes his hand, I also  
I answer

"hot" shake: well, I think, scoundrel, the last shake, tomorrow at 2 o'clock we will wait for you. (Laughter). We won't shake your hand, but we'll shake your tail... With such a perfidious person, only

that's how it had to be done. If we had told him at least a little earlier that he was a scoundrel, then I am convinced that he would have dealt with us ... he would bury you, give a speech and hang a sign: "Here lies a leader of the party and government" ... He is capable of this . He

able to pour poison "(ibid., p. 158; emphasis added by me. - A. 4.). Khrushchev admitted that he acted treacherously with the treacherous Beria. The art of treachery was taught to them by Stalin himself, whom they also treacherously deprived of life and power. Like a teacher, like a student...

A. AVTORKHANOV  
Olching, 1991